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Moral Emotions i 
Abstract 
In the present research we extended previous studies examining moral emotion 
expectancies in childhood to investigate the relationship between moral emotion 
expectancies and moral behavior in adolescence. A secondary goal was to explore the 
relationships among moral emotion expectancies, the moral self, and moral action. Two 
hundred and thirty-five adolescents in grades 7,9, 11, and first year university completed 
a structured interview assessing moral emotion expectancies in various situations in 
which a moral norm is either regarded or disregarded. Participants distributed up to 10 
plastic chips on nine emotional expressions to indicate how they expected to feel in each 
moral situation and also provided an overall emotion rating for each scenario that 
averaged across all the specific emotions they anticipated. A written questionnaire 
measured self-reported prosocial and antisocial behavior by asking participants how often 
they engaged in a list of activities in the past year. The questionnaire also included a 
measure of self-centrality of moral values to the individuals' identity. Self-evaluative 
moral emotion expectancies were shown to have associations with antisocial and 
prosocial behavior, but it was the overall emotion ratings that were most closely 
associated with behavior. Thus, moral emotions do not appear to stand out against other, 
more basic emotions when predicting moral action. These overall ratings were associated 
with self-reported levels of antisocial behavior while moral self scores were better 
predictors of self-reported prosocial behavior. Additionally, the relationship between 
emotion expectancies and antisocial behavior was also found to be moderated by age, 
with emotion expectancies becoming more predictive of self-reported antisocial action 
with age. 
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Moral Emotions 1 
Moral Emotion Expectancies and Moral Behavior in Adolescence 
Every day individuals are presented with opportunities to transgress the moral 
standards or norms set out by society. Similarly, people are also frequently faced with 
situations in which they can uphold their own moral ideals, or those of society, and act in 
an altruistic fashion. In each type of situation, individuals must make a decision about 
whether they wish to do 'the right thing' or not. What factors influence the actions chosen 
by individuals when presented with such a moral conflict? Clearly, the action of 
transgressing a moral rule, or in contrast, the action of abiding by a moral rule when 
presented with an opportunity to transgress, results from more than a simple decision of 
whether a certain behavior is right or wrong. Children as young as 4 are able to judge the 
wrongness of actions such as hitting others and they also base these judgments on the 
principles of harm and fairness rather than the rules set out by authority figures (Wiersma 
& Laupa, 2000). Despite the fact these children know that transgressing a rule is wrong, 
they often will attribute positive emotions to transgressors (e.g. Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 
2006). 
Thus, factors other than the inherent right or wrongness of an action, such as the 
emotions evoked by that action for example, may influence decisions about moral 
behavior. With this research we set out to study the association that exists between the 
moral emotions that individuals anticipate following moral or immoral actions and the 
levels of moral behavior (both prosocial and antisocial) that people report. The rationale 
for this research begins with the idea that emotions play a role in the decision-making 
process. Previous findings supporting this idea are presented before the discussion moves 
on to focus specifically on the self-conscious moral emotions. A significant body of 
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literature exists to link moral emotions and moral behavior, at least in early and middle 
childhood, and the present research was aimed at extending this to adolescence. 
Following the demonstration of a link between moral emotions and moral action, 
a separate line of research linking the self-relevance of moral characteristics and moral 
behavior will be discussed. The importance of moral characteristics to the self represents 
another factor influencing the moral decision-making process, independent from 
emotional expectations. Disentangling the relationships among moral emotion 
expectancies, moral trait self-relevance, and moral action was one goal of the current 
research. After presenting the literature supporting each of these relationships, the goals 
and hypotheses of the present study are discussed in greater detail before continuing on to 
the methodology and results of this research. The primary purpose of undertaking this 
study was to explore the association between moral emotion expectancies and moral 
behavior in adolescence. 
Moral Reasoning and Moral Action 
Early research on moral development focused on the role of moral judgment, 
exemplified by Piaget's (1932) cognitive-developmental approach to the growth of moral 
thought. This framework was extended by Kohlberg (1963) to create an influential model 
of moral reasoning. Kohlberg defined six qualitatively distinct stages of moral reasoning 
which he believed people progressed through in a stepwise fashion, with each successive 
stage representing a more sophisticated level of moral reasoning. Kohlberg suggested that 
moral reasoning should be related to moral action, and even argued that behavior could 
only be seen as moral if it was informed by moral judgment (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). 
However, research aiming to demonstrate a relationship between Kohlberg's stages of 
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moral reasoning and behavioral outcomes has demonstrated only weak associations (e.g. 
Fodor, 1972; Ruma & Mosher, 1967; Schwartz, Feldman, Brown, & Heingartner, 1969). 
In general, research which has found a link between moral judgment and behavior has 
focused on individuals who demonstrate low levels of moral judgment and high levels of 
delinquent activity (e.g. Stams et al., 2006) while little empirical support exists for a 
relation between more sophisticated levels of moral judgment and high levels of moral or 
prosocial behavior (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). For example, Hart and Fegley (1995) found 
no differences in moral reasoning between a group of adolescents demonstrating unusual 
commitments to care for others and a group of control adolescents. Similar findings are 
reported by Colby and Damon (1992). 
Therefore, while many studies have found relations between moral reasoning and 
measures of moral behavior which are statistically significant, these relations account for 
only a small portion of variance (Krebs & Denton, 2006). Even Kohlberg has stated that 
the association between moral judgment and moral behavior is not fully defined, 
acknowledging that moral judgment is necessary but not sufficient for moral action 
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Other variables such as motivation and emotion will play a 
role. Blasi (1999) argues that moral understanding alone can not fully explain moral 
action or moral motivation. He highlights the idea that emotion can produce action 
tendencies which motivate behavior. Over time, emotions become connected to those 
behaviors which tend to reduce feelings of discomfort and in this way acquire 
motivational force. Hence, the anticipation of negative emotional consequences (e.g. 
guilt) may motivate an individual to avoid certain behaviors; in the same way, the 
Moral Emotions 4 
anticipation of positive emotional consequences (e.g. pride) may motivate that person to 
engage in other behaviors. 
Other researchers (e.g. Haidt, 2001) have similarly pointed out the fact that the 
relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior is weak and have argued that 
emotions play a much greater role in determining behavior. Evidence for an association 
between emotions and moral behavior is presented in the following sections, beginning 
with research demonstrating the role of emotions in the decision making process (i.e. the 
decision to enact a certain behavior). 
The Role of Emotions in Decision Making 
The "happy victimizer" expectancy mentioned previously, that wrongdoers will 
be happy after achieving a desired outcome through immoral actions, demonstrates that 
moral knowledge and moral emotions are quite uncoordinated in young children. 
Although children are able to experience moral emotions such as guilt and shame at 3-4 
years of age, they do not expect to experience these emotions in moral situations until 
about 7-8 years of age (Eisenberg, 2000). By adulthood, however, there appears to be a 
much closer connection between moral knowledge and moral emotions (Haidt, 2001). 
The significance of this developmental achievement is that the emotions anticipated in 
social situations are likely to influence the behaviors that an individual chooses to enact. 
Indeed, recent research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in the decision-
making process (e.g. Izard, Fine, Schultz, Mostow, Ackerman, & Youngstrom, 2001; 
Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). 
Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) provide a model of social information processing in 
which an individual's database of social information includes both emotion memories 
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and emotion-related skills. While emotion memories provide information about previous 
emotional experiences, the emotion-related skills allow for the activation of emotions 
appropriate to a given situation and also allow for accurate interpretation of social cues. 
In this way, the ability to interpret and activate emotions will impact the decision-making 
process and the behavior that results. As such, individuals who differ in their emotional 
competencies will likely differ in the behaviors that result from these processes. Izard et 
al. (2001) similarly refer to emotion knowledge, or the ability to anticipate the emotional 
reaction of the self in a given situation based on social cues, and to accurately interpret 
emotion signals. It is argued that emotion knowledge facilitates appropriate social 
behavior, whether this entails prosocial behavior or the avoidance of rule transgression, 
as social cues are more likely to be interpreted in ways that activate the appropriate 
emotions. 
This link between emotion knowledge and behavior resulting from the social 
decision-making process has been clearly established. Izard et al. (2001) demonstrated 
that emotion knowledge in preschool significantly predicts behavioral outcomes such as 
assertion and cooperation in third grade. Those children who were more skilled at 
recognizing and labeling emotional expressions at age 5 were more likely to display 
cooperative behaviors at age 9 and less likely to display negative behaviors such as 
hyperactivity. Additionally, girls tend to possess more emotion knowledge than boys and, 
similarly, engage in more prosocial behavior than boys (Schultz, Izard, & Ackerman, 
2000). 
In the moral domain specifically, awareness of moral emotions has been shown to 
relate to measures of moral behavior. Miller, Eisenberg, Fabes, and Shell (1996) found 
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that children's vicarious emotional responses, such as empathy, were positively 
associated with the child's level of moral reasoning and a measure of peer-directed 
helping. In this study, children's prosocial behavior was positively associated with self-
reported negative emotions in response to distressed peers and negatively associated with 
self-reported positive emotions to the distressed children. In preschool, children who 
possess more emotion knowledge also show more prosocial behavior (Denham, 
McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990). Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler (1992) found that 
children who were more skilled at attributing moral emotions to story characters were 
less likely to cheat than less skilled children when given the opportunity. This study 
showed that a group of 6- and 7-year-old children did not differ in their cognitive 
understanding of the validity of moral rules but there was a large amount of variance in 
the moral emotions attributed to wrongdoers, and these emotion attributions predicted the 
children's behavior when presented with real moral conflict situations. 
Research has shown that both aggressive and nonaggressive children demonstrate 
moral knowledge, that is, they know what the "right" thing to do is, but this does not 
necessarily mean that the action will be performed (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004). Haidt 
(2001) argues that the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior is weak 
and that emotions play a greater role in determining behavior. In accordance with this, 
Arsenio, Cooperman, and Lover (2000) demonstrated that higher levels of aggression-
related happiness predicted the likelihood of children initiating aggression. 
In fact, research has demonstrated that an individual's perception of the severity 
of moral transgression is inferred in part from his or her affective response to the 
transgression (Pham, 2007; Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005). Indeed, the 
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emotional responses people experience may be the means through which moral dilemmas 
are evaluated (Haidt, 2001). This "social intuitionist" approach argues that emotion is a 
driving force in moral judgment. People respond to moral situations with an instinctive 
emotional response, and then moral reasoning is used to justify or explain this response. 
Neuroimaging studies have supported this perspective by demonstrating that moral 
dilemmas activate parts of the brain typically associated with emotions (Greene & Haidt, 
2002). In one fMRI study, Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley and Cohen (2001) 
revealed that responses to moral dilemmas produced increased activity in areas of the 
brain associated with emotional processing, but this increased activity was not seen to 
responses to non-moral dilemmas. As such, emotions do appear to play a role in moral 
decision-making. 
A second model of social decision-making also predicts this link between 
emotional competence and behavior by adding in the role of emotion expectancies, or the 
anticipated affective consequences of a behavior. Originally, Crick and Dodge (1994) 
asserted that decision making first involves attention, encoding, and interpretation of the 
situation. Possible responses are then generated by the individual and each response is 
evaluated based on the anticipated consequences of that action. Finally, the response 
which is expected to produce the most positive outcome is enacted. This model was 
expanded upon by Dodge and Price (1994) who believed that emotional processes make 
contributions to social decision making which are distinct from the contributions of 
cognitive processes. Specifically, emotions motivate behavior and cognition in ways that 
facilitate the enactment of adaptive, goal-directed responses. Dodge and Price (1994) 
argued that, in addition to situational cues, internal emotional cues must also be encoded 
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and interpreted. Moreover, an important part of the response evaluation process involves 
an individual's expectation of the emotional consequences that will result from different 
possible responses (Dodge & Price, 1994). 
Moral Emotion Expectancies 
Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007) argue that moral emotions influence 
behavior in two ways: as consequential emotions following actual behavior and as 
anticipatory emotions as we evaluate behavioral alternatives. Thus, actual behavior is not 
required for moral emotions to have an effect on decision-making; rather, individuals can 
anticipate the likely emotional outcomes of certain behaviors, thus informing their 
decision to act. Based on the idea that expectations of emotional consequences will 
impact the behaviors that are enacted in a given situation, the present research was 
undertaken to examine the relationship between expectations of moral emotions and self-
reported behavior in moral situations, such as when tempted to break a moral rule to 
obtain a desired object. Krettenauer, Malti, and Sokol (2008) report research 
demonstrating that self-attributed moral emotions have a much greater impact on 
negative behaviors (e.g. aggression) than other-attributed emotions. For example, Malti 
and Keller (in press) found that boys with high levels of self-attributed moral emotions 
displayed lower levels of externalizing behavior than boys with low levels of self-
attributed moral emotions. For this reason, the current study focused on self-attributed 
moral emotions. 
Haidt (2003) defines moral emotions as those "that are linked to the interests or 
welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent" 
(p.276). The self-conscious moral emotions are those that result from reflection on one's 
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self and the evaluation of the self against a set of standards and values. Upon self-
reflection, these emotions provide an immediate punishment or reinforcement of behavior 
(Tangney et al., 2007). The self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, and embarrassment 
have all been shown to play a role in morality, and guilt and shame, specifically, are often 
viewed as fundamental to this process (Eisenberg, 2000). Recently, however, guilt has 
been recognized as more of a moral emotion than shame, as it is argued that shame arises 
from both moral and nonmoral situations, whereas guilt tends to result specifically in 
response to moral circumstances (Eisenberg, 2000). Additionally, the moral function of 
guilt in motivating moral behavior has received empirical support, whereas little to no 
evidence has been found for the moral function of shame (Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt is 
experienced when a person fails to meet some standard or goal and attributes this failure 
to the self (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). 
Embarrassment is also viewed as playing a more minor role in morality, as 
compared to guilt, due to the less negative and less serious nature of the affect associated 
with embarrassment (Tangney et al., 2007). Typically, embarrassment is experienced 
when a person fails to meet a social convention (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). Guilt, shame, 
and embarrassment are emotions typically described as self-conscious, but pride and self-
satisfaction are additional emotions which result from the processes of self-reflection and 
self-evaluation in response to moral behavior (Tangney et al., 2007). However, little 
research has examined these positive self-evaluative moral emotions in relation to moral 
behavior. Pride has most frequently been explored in response to achievements in 
scholastic, occupational, and athletic domains, but Tangney and colleagues (2007) argue 
that feelings of pride in response to fulfillment of morally relevant standards may be an 
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important motivator of future behavior. The emotion of pride is experienced in reaction to 
a behavior, resulting from the individual's own efforts, which brings the self closer to 
important goals and standards (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). 
Far from simply representing post hoc reactions to one's behavior, the self-
conscious moral emotions can be seen as providing motivational force to act in positive 
ways and to avoid acting in negative ways (Kroll & Egan, 2004). Experiencing these 
emotions provides salient feedback on our moral acceptability following behavioral 
responses and also in anticipation of a particular response. The anticipation of guilt and 
embarrassment as consequential to a given response can exert a strong influence on the 
moral behavior that is chosen (Tangney et al., 2007). For Tangney and colleagues (2007), 
these expectations are based on one's history, that is, the actual emotions that have been 
experienced in reaction to similar behaviors and events. Theorists from the social 
intuitionist perspective on moral functioning similarly argue that positive moral emotions 
represent units of prosocial motivation and serve to activate the procedural enactment of 
a behavior (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Leffel, Fritz, & Stephens, 2008). 
Experiencing moral emotions in reaction to moral situations is quite common by 
middle childhood and from this point on these emotions exert an influence on moral 
behavior (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). For example, individuals who are more prone to 
experience guilt tend to display lower levels of aggression than less guilt-prone 
individuals (Tangney et al., 2007). Additionally, it was found that children who were 
more prone to experience guilt in fifth grade were less likely to be arrested, less likely to 
abuse drugs, and more likely to practice safe sex in adolescence (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). Thus, it appears that an expectation of guilt may inhibit individuals from engaging 
Moral Emotions 11 
in negative behaviors. Similar research has shown that people will conform and behave in 
a conciliatory manner in order to avoid embarrassment, which may include adherence to 
moral standards (Leary, Landel, & Patton, 1996). In the same way, the expectation of 
pride or self-satisfaction may motivate individuals to strive to meet moral standards or to 
inhibit the impulse to disregard moral standards (Tangney et al., 2007). 
Research of this nature follows from the emotionalist approach to moral 
judgment, which views emotions as a primary cause of moral judgment and behavior, in 
contrast to more rationalist, cognitive approaches (Kagan, 1984). This perspective 
highlights the fact that moral situations inherently include emotional content, such as 
anticipated guilt, and the decision-making literature suggests that this content influences 
the decisions of individuals when they choose the option which will bring them the least 
amount of discomfort (e.g. guilt; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). In line with this idea, 
research with children has demonstrated an association between moral emotion 
expectancies (the anticipation of moral emotions such as guilt and pride) and moral 
behavior, supporting the idea that it is the expectation of certain emotions that regulates 
behavior, rather than an actual emotional experience (e.g. Lake, Lane, & Harris, 1995). 
For example, Lake et al. (1995) found that children who were better able to anticipate the 
emotional outcomes of moral transgressions were more likely to resist a temptation to 
cheat, even when age was partialled out. A group of 5- to 6-year old children were read a 
story in which a character yields to a temptation and were asked how they thought the 
character would feel. Children who predicted more morally oriented emotions were more 
likely to avoid peeking during the experimenter's absence on a later guessing task. 
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The importance to social reasoning of understanding the emotional consequences 
of behavior is also demonstrated by research conducted by Arsenio (1988) with 
elementary school children. Children whose conceptions of the emotional consequences 
of certain sociomoral events differed greatly from the normative conceptions were less 
skilled at using information from emotional expressions to ascertain what type of 
sociomoral event had occurred than children whose conceptions of emotional 
consequences were closer to the norm. Arsenio (1988) uses this finding to suggest that 
children with atypical emotional expectations may believe that their behavior will result 
in different consequences than children with typical emotional expectations. A script-like 
connection between sociomoral events and emotional outcomes is also proposed, which 
individuals use to anticipate the emotional consequences of a certain response in a 
particular moral situation. 
This connection between moral emotion expectancies and moral behavior has 
been most thoroughly explored in studies involving aggressive or violent youth. Lochman 
and Dodge (1994) found that, in contrast to non-aggressive boys, aggressive adolescents 
were more likely to indicate that they would feel happy in social situations which 
typically evoke negative emotions. Children were read a number of scenarios depicting 
emotion-inducing situations and were asked to indicate the emotions they expected to 
experience in those situations. In situations typically eliciting negative emotions, boys 
classified as aggressive by their teachers were more likely to indicate that they would feel 
happy (Lochman & Dodge, 1994). Arsenio, Gold, and Adams (2004) found similar 
results when comparing a group of aggressive adolescents to an adolescent comparison 
group. In terms of non-aggressive emotion expectancies, aggressive adolescents overall 
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expected to experience lower levels of emotion and were lower than the comparison 
group on each emotion category. For aggressive situations, the aggressive youth expected 
to feel happier than the comparison group. All emotion expectancy variables in the study 
were related to the behavioral outcomes of aggression and externalizing behavior 
(Arsenio et al., 2004). Finally, Slaby and Guerra (1988) compared violent youth with 
aggressive high school students and non-aggressive high school students and found a 
continuum of social-cognitive skills. The group of violent youth displayed the most 
social-cognitive deficiencies, followed by the aggressive students while non-aggressive 
students had the highest level of social-cognitive skills. The findings demonstrate that 
some aspects of social cognition differ quantitatively rather than qualitatively (i.e. 
between violent and non-violent youth). Therefore, quantitative differences may also 
exist in the ability to anticipate emotional outcomes, rather than a qualitative distinction 
between typical and atypical individuals. 
These studies, comparing aggressive and non-aggressive youth, comprise the 
majority of research examining the relationship between moral emotion expectancies and 
moral behavior in adolescence. A few other studies have extended this research by 
comparing special populations to look at moral emotion expectancies in normal 
adolescents (e.g. Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006) but the present study was the first to 
explicitly study the relationship between self-evaluative moral emotion expectancies and 
the behavior of normal adolescents. The goal was to determine whether results obtained 
in these previous studies can be generalized to the adolescent population as a whole. 
Findings such as those of Slaby and Guerra (1988) and Lochman and Dodge (1994) 
suggest that individuals may differ quantitatively in their emotion attribution abilities, 
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and this individual difference may explain some variance in the moral behavior enacted 
by these individuals. 
Additionally, while the connection between moral emotion expectancies and 
antisocial behavior has been previously studied, minimal attention has been given to the 
association between moral emotion expectancies and prosocial behavior, which we 
focused on in this study. Recently, Malti, Gummerum, and Buchmann (2007) reported 
that children's self-attributed moral emotions predicted mother-rated prosocial behavior. 
Additionally, Gummerum, Keller, Rust, and Hanoch (as cited in Krettenauer et al., 2008) 
found that the emotion attributions of 3- to 5-year-olds to victimizers predicted their 
prosocial behavior in a sharing situation. These studies with young children are the first 
demonstrations of a relationship between moral emotion expectancies and prosocial 
behavior. This study was first to examine the role of moral emotion expectancies in the 
prosocial behavior displayed by adolescents. Research has demonstrated that emotion 
knowledge is related to children's prosocial behavior (e.g. Izard et al., 2001) and it may 
be the case that moral emotion expectancies are similarly related to prosocial activities. 
Perhaps in part because previous research has focused more on antisocial, as 
opposed to prosocial, behavior, there is a lack of literature on the role of positively 
valenced moral emotion expectancies in moral behavior. Previous studies have looked at 
the moral emotions of guilt, shame, and embarrassment, but fewer have examined the 
role of pride and satisfaction in prosocial and antisocial behavior. Research by Lagatutta 
(2005), however, has shown that as children get older they increasingly attribute positive 
or mixed emotions to characters who make willpower decisions and choose not to 
transgress rules. This study found that 4- and 5-year old children were significantly less 
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likely than 7-year-olds and adults to predict that people would feel good after abiding by 
the rules or would feel both negative and positive emotions in situations where their 
desires conflict with the rules. 
Interestingly, Lagatutta (2005) also found that positive emotions were more likely 
to be attributed to rule-abiding characters by both children and adults when the character 
recalled the rules internally versus when the character was reminded of the rules 
externally. Rule source did not influence the emotion attributions of the children and 
adults following a rule transgression, however. If these findings similarly apply to 
emotion expectations for the self, it would suggest that positive emotion expectancies 
may be more predictive of behavior than negative emotion expectancies. Individuals may 
be more likely to expect positive emotions when their behavior results from internal 
principles than when based on external prescriptions; similarly, behavior is likely to be 
more consistent when it is based on internal values rather than external, situational 
factors. Expectations of negative emotions were not based on rule source, however, 
suggesting that these expectancies may be less predictive of behavior as they do not differ 
for internally versus externally regulated actions. This is one of the few studies to 
examine the expectation of positive emotions following rule abidance, and no research 
has examined how positive emotion expectancies influence moral behavior. This was one 
of our key goals in the present research. Investigating the role of positive emotion 
expectancies seems critical, as encouraging the realization in children and adolescents 
that following the rules can result in feelings of pride and satisfaction may be more 
conducive to socially appropriate behavior than attempting to socialize expectations of 
guilt and embarrassment after rule transgressions (Lagatutta, 2005). 
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The Development of Moral Emotion Expectancies 
The connection between expectations of moral emotions and moral judgment 
appears to be a developmental achievement. In a study by Nunner-Winkler (1999), 4-to 
8-year olds were all able to correctly evaluate an action as immoral; however, these 
children differed in their expectations of personal moral consequences of these actions. 
The majority of 4-year-olds expected to feel good after engaging in an immoral action 
and the expectation of negative emotions increased with age. Similarly, Lake et al. (1995) 
found that the ability to anticipate the emotional consequences of rule transgressions 
increased between the ages of 4 and 9; specifically, older children were more likely to 
expect a wrongdoer to feel happy after resisting the temptation to take a candy without 
permission and to feel bad after giving in to this temptation. Thus, it appears that the 
coordination of moral judgment and moral emotions increases with age. 
The expectation of self-conscious moral emotions also develops with age. 
Murgatroyd and Robinson (1997) argue that an individual will experience one or more of 
three possible categories of emotions after they have committed an immoral act: (1) 
positive emotions based on achievement of desired outcomes (e.g. happiness), (2) 
negative emotions based on a fear of punishment, and (3) negative emotions based on 
empathy with a victim or possible disapproval from others (e.g. guilt). It is this third 
category which represents moral maturity and which does not appear until around the age 
of 8 (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). When comparing the emotion attributions of 7-
and 10-year-olds to a person who commits an immoral act, Murgatroyd and Robinson 
(1997) found that the 7-year-olds were more likely to attribute negative emotions to the 
wrongdoer when a disapproving adult witness was present than when a mistakenly 
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pleased adult was present. The attributions of negative emotions by the 10-year-olds did 
not differ in these two conditions, however, suggesting that when the third, most mature 
category of moral emotions (e.g. guilt) first emerges a disapproving witness may be 
necessary, but with increasing age the morality of a situation may be enough to evoke the 
anticipation of negative moral emotions. 
Interestingly, the same study was performed with adult participants and it was 
shown that even when adults were allowed to list as many emotions as they wished when 
attributing emotions to wrongdoers, 30% of participants failed to list any moral emotions 
(Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1997). This finding suggests that even in adulthood, the 
anticipation of moral emotions following a transgression can not be taken for granted. 
Murgatroyd & Robinson (1993) similarly found that a group of undergraduate 
participants did not consistently indicate that wrongdoers would experience negative 
emotions after an immoral act. In fact, happiness can still occur for adults after moral rule 
transgressions in certain situations (Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1993). Thus, the 
expectation of moral emotions after immoral acts develops with age and even by 
adulthood may not be fully established. The expectation of moral emotions after 
prosocial moral behavior may show a similar developmental trend which was examined 
in our research. 
While the expectation of moral emotions becomes more coordinated with moral 
judgment as an individual develops, it is unknown how long this coordination continues 
to improve. Research does exist to suggest that there is a certain amount of change in 
moral emotion expectancies that occurs across adolescence (Krettenauer & Eichler, 
2006). Although few studies have examined moral emotion expectancies beyond 
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childhood, the correlation between these expectancies and adolescents' certainty in their 
moral judgments increases with age suggesting that the coordination of these processes 
continues to develop well into adolescence. As moral emotion expectancies develop, they 
may become more predictive of moral behavior. That is, as the expectation of moral 
emotions following moral acts becomes more established and consistent, they may come 
to exert a greater influence over behavior. Additionally, as individuals grow older they 
may begin to take the emotional consequences of their actions more seriously and be 
more likely to act on these emotion expectancies. Especially during adolescence, a time 
when self-awareness and self-consciousness is heightened (e.g., Enright, Shukla, & 
Lapsley, 1980; Rankin, Lane, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 2004), the anticipation of self-
conscious moral emotions such as embarrassment and guilt may have a strong impact on 
behavior. Finally, an increasing influence of moral emotion expectancies on behavior is 
supported by the idea that as individuals enter adolescence they begin to form moral 
identities and integrate moral values into the self. 
Self-importance of Moral Values 
A separate line of research has examined the association between the 'moral self 
and moral behavior. The moral self can be conceptualized as the values and beliefs which 
become internalized through the processes of socialization and are represented in an 
individual's view of him or herself. It is believed that this moral self then serves as a 
regulator of moral conduct (Kochanska, 2002). The self provides a person with a sense of 
coherence, agency, and also a sense of control over their body and action (Emde, 
Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991). 
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Thus, in order to maintain this sense of coherence and consistency, moral behavior may 
be shaped by the self-view that individuals have of themselves on moral dimensions, or 
how important moral characteristics are to their sense of self. 
This idea is supported by research on the development of the early self. Emde and 
colleagues (1991) argue that a moral self has developed by the age of three through both 
a set of motives which are biologically prepared and through interactions with caregivers. 
This moral self includes an individual's inclinations of what to do and what not to do and 
regulates conflicts between personal desires and social obligations. Once developed this 
moral self acts as a guide for moral conduct, first through procedural knowledge until 
values are fully internalized (Emde et al., 1991). Based on a review of several models of 
early and middle childhood, Harter (1998) found consensus in the belief that the self 
increasingly acts as a guide; roles and values become internalized as personal standards 
of conduct which regulate behavior. 
Similarly, Deci & Ryan's (2000) self-determination theory suggests that moral 
conduct will be influenced by the extent to which moral values are internalized to the 
self. Self-determination theory argues that values which are fully internalized and 
integrated into the self are more likely to elicit behavior for intrinsic reasons than values 
which are only partially internalized. Integration occurs when values are assimilated to 
the self and brought into congruence with the other values that comprise the self. Values 
which are fully internalized are integrated into the self, or one's identity, and thus, 
behavior following from these ideals is spontaneous and natural (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Similarly, the differing motivations individuals possess for engaging in behavior (e.g. 
passive compliance vs. active personal commitment) are seen as a reflection of the degree 
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to which the relevant value has been internalized and integrated to the self. In other 
words, the extent to which moral concerns are integrated and internalized into an 
individual's moral self will impact his or her motivation to engage in moral behavior. 
Although the moral self is present by the age of three, it is likely to continue to 
develop and change throughout childhood and into adolescence. Adolescence is a critical 
period for the formation of a coherent identity (Erikson, 1959) and during this time many 
individuals may become more or less committed to certain moral ideals. Studies of value 
internalization often focus on younger children and compliance with parental demands 
(e.g. Kochanska, 2002) but it is during adolescence that individuals come to define 
themselves through the acceptance of values and beliefs as their own (Deci & Ryan, 
1991). During the identity exploration and development that comes with adolescence, 
values beyond those taught by parents may be considered, resulting in the continued 
development of the moral self. 
Research by Nunner-Winkler (1998; 2007) on moral motivation highlights the 
idea that moral identities are still developing well into adolescence. Moral motivation 
derives from the importance a person attributes to moral values and interests and has been 
found to relate to various measures of behavior. For example, in adolescents aged 17 and 
22, low moral motivation is associated with a higher number of rule transgressions 
(Nunner-Winkler, 2007). Moral motivation is thought to vary between individuals and to 
increase with age; when moral desires are integrated into a person's identity, moral action 
will follow from this. Nunner-Winkler (1998) suggests that while young children 
understand the validity of moral rules, they lack the moral motivation that comes from 
making moral values an important personal concern, and this prevents them from 
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fulfilling moral obligations when doing so conflicts with their own desires. When young 
children are presented with situations in which norms collided with personal desires, they 
tend to expect a person to feel good after transgressing and Nunner-Winkler (1998) takes 
this as an indication that young children lack moral motivation. Essentially, they do not 
have the motivation to do the right thing if it requires letting personal desires go 
unfulfilled because following moral rules is not an important moral concern for them. 
Nunner-Winkler (2007) demonstrated an increase in the average level of moral 
motivation between the ages of 4 and 22, but also noted that a considerable amount of 
change occurred within individuals as they aged. It was suggested that value orientations 
likely change due to social context factors and changing life circumstances. This research 
seems to suggest that the importance assigned to moral values as part of an individual's 
identity will impact moral behavior and that this process of value internalization 
continues well into adolescence. 
An association between the self-importance of moral values and behavior is also 
highlighted in research by Hart (2005), who views a moral identity as the integration of 
action plans and emotions which are the result of occasional conscious moral 
deliberations. When faced with a moral decision, people do not engage in conscious, 
rational calculations, but rather act in line with their consolidated moral identity (Hart, 
2005). The integration of moral values to the self makes these values more salient (Blasi, 
1995) and can also lead to the formation of action plans that make moral behavior more 
likely to result when faced with moral conflict (Colby & Damon, 1992). In fact, research 
has shown that endorsing the moral values of the self is more predictive of prosocial 
behavior than endorsement of positive but non-moral values of the self (Pratt, 
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Hunsberger, Pancer, & Alisat, 2003) which suggests that the integration of moral values 
to the self is associated with moral behavior. Additionally, this research by Pratt et al. 
(2003) found that individuals' moral self-ideals were stronger at age 19 than at age 17, 
which suggests that adolescents are still developing their moral identities at this age. 
Further evidence that the self-importance of moral values is related to moral 
behavior comes from research by Barriga, Morrison, Liau, and Gibbs (2001). It was 
shown that males and females did not differ in moral judgment, but females were both 
higher in moral self-relevance and lower in levels of antisocial behavior. This suggests 
that the differing levels of antisocial behavior displayed by males and females are not due 
to any differences in moral judgment but rather to the degree to which people consider 
moral values relevant to their identity. In the study by Barriga et al. (2001) it was 
demonstrated that self-serving cognitive distortions, such as rationalizations and 
justifications, partially mediated the relationship between lower moral self-relevance and 
antisocial behavior. Moral self-relevance was shown to discourage the rationalization of 
or disengagement from one's actions, thereby limiting antisocial behaviors. This research 
demonstrates one way in which an individual's moral self can influence their decision to 
engage in moral or immoral action. 
Additional research has also shown the importance of moral self-relevance to 
prosocial behavior. For example, the importance of moral values to the self has been 
shown to relate to teacher reports of ethical behavior in adolescence (Arnold, 1993). 
Colby and Damon (1995), in a study of adult moral exemplars, found that moral goals are 
central to these individuals' conceptions of their own identity, and similar research with 
adolescents by Hart, Yates, Fegley, and Wilson (1995) demonstrated that individuals 
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deeply committed to the care of others were more likely to use moral goals and moral 
personality traits when asked to describe themselves, as compared to a matched group of 
peers. 
Aquino and Reed (2002) developed a measure of the self-importance of moral 
traits to an individual's identity and found that this measure was related to several 
behavioral outcomes. The authors found that moral trait self-importance could be broken 
down into two dimensions: symbolization, or the degree to which moral traits are 
reflected in the individual's actions, and internalization, or the degree to which moral 
traits are central to the self-concept. Both dimensions were shown to predict self-reported 
levels of volunteerism and scores on the symbolization dimension were positively 
associated with the level of perceived intrinsic satisfaction with those volunteer activities. 
Additionally, the internalization dimension was found to predict the quantity of food 
individuals actually donated to a food drive (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Thus, the degree to 
which moral traits are viewed as important to an individual's identity is associated in 
various ways with both moral and immoral behavioral outcomes. 
Relationships among the Moral Self, Moral Emotions, and Moral Behavior 
The previously discussed research demonstrates an association between moral 
emotions and moral behavior and an association between the moral self and moral 
behavior. The present research is aimed at exploring the efficacy of moral emotion 
expectancies in predicting moral behavior and, therefore, it is important to compare the 
association found between action and emotion expectancies to that between action and 
the moral self. If internalized values and beliefs are more closely associated with 
behavior in moral contexts than the anticipated emotional consequences, this will suggest 
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that moral emotion expectancies, like moral judgment, are not as important of a 
determinant of moral behavior and that future research should focus on the role of the 
moral self. Demonstrating superior predictive power of moral emotion expectancies, 
however, would highlight the importance of the association between these expectancies 
and levels of moral and immoral behavior. Figure 1 presents a depiction of the 
relationships under investigation. From a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that 
the moral self would be associated with moral emotion expectancies, as one function of 
emotions is thought to be informing individuals of the importance of moral values and 
concerns in their motivational structure (Blasi, 1999). This relationship was examined 
briefly in the current research, but was not an association of primary interest. 
As previous research has demonstrated the importance of both moral emotions 
and the moral self in moral action, either of these variables could be the superior 
predictor. Most research demonstrating a link between the moral self and moral behavior 
has focused on prosocial activities as the outcome measure (e.g. Arnold, 1993; Colby & 
Damon, 1995) whereas most research indicating an association between moral emotions 
and moral behavior has focused on antisocial activities (e.g. Arsensio et al., 2004; 
Lochman & Dodge, 1994). In the present research we explored both of these predictors in 
the context of both antisocial behavior and prosocial behavior. 
If moral emotion expectancies are found to have a greater connection than moral 
self scores with levels of prosocial and antisocial behavior then this would emphasize the 
importance of the relationship between emotion and behavior. This would suggest that 
the anticipations regarding emotional consequences might be more important to the 
decision-making process than internalized values when faced with an opportunity to 
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engage in moral or immoral actions. This, in turn, could have implications for programs 
aimed at either reducing antisocial behaviors by adolescents or encouraging prosocial 
activities. 
The Present Research 
The present research was an examination of the relationship between moral 
emotion expectancies and self-reported moral action, both prosocial and antisocial, across 
adolescence. As previously mentioned, this association has been demonstrated in 
comparisons between groups of aggressive and non-aggressive youth (e.g. Lochman & 
Dodge, 1994; Arsenio et al., 2004). While this relationship has not previously been 
examined in a population of typically developing adolescents, it is likely that this 
association can also help to explain differences in prosocial and antisocial behavior in a 
normative population of youth. Slaby and Guerra (1988) demonstrated quantitative 
differences in aspects of social cognition among groups of adolescents and the ability to 
accurately anticipate the emotional consequences of certain behaviors may similarly vary 
in a quantitative fashion between individuals. In this way, emotion expectancies may 
provide an explanation for why some people choose to engage in prosocial behavior and 
why others engage in antisocial actions. 
The findings of previous studies exploring moral emotion expectancies have been 
based on self-reports of behaviors, but in the present study we examined observed moral 
behavior in addition to self-reports. Additionally, the role of moral emotion expectancies 
in adolescent prosocial behavior had not been previously explored. Recent research with 
children (e.g. Lagattuta, 2005) suggests that moral emotion expectancies may contribute 
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to prosocial activities in a similar way to antisocial behavior. This idea was further 
explored in the current research by investigating this relationship in adolescents. 
Additionally, we examined the role of positive self-evaluative moral emotion 
expectancies (i.e. pride and satisfaction) in both prosocial and antisocial behavior. It was 
hypothesized that adolescent behavior may be motivated by expectations of pride and 
satisfaction following either moral actions or resistance of temptations to act immorally. 
By including these positive moral emotion expectancies, the association between these 
expectancies and moral behavior can be compared to the association between negative 
emotion expectancies and moral behavior. 
As the ability to anticipate the emotional consequences of rule transgressions 
increases during childhood, it appears that this capacity improves with age. Little 
research in this area has extended into the adolescent years, however, so it is unknown 
how long this ability continues to develop. Research has shown that the coordination of 
moral judgment and moral emotion improves with age in a large sample of high school 
students (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006) so it appears that there may be changes in moral 
emotion expectancies during this time. Additionally, these moral emotion expectancies 
may come to exert a stronger influence on behavior with age. As individuals are forming 
identities and integrating moral concerns into the self during adolescence, the anticipated 
emotional consequences of actions may become more stable and may be taken more 
seriously by the individual. 
Finally, previous literature has provided evidence for associations between both 
moral emotions and behavior and the moral self and behavior. This research was 
designed to disentangle the relationships among these three variables. While an 
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association between moral emotion expectancies and moral action is hypothesized, the 
moral self may represent a better predictor of behavior than any of the emotion variables 
under investigation. On the other hand, emotion expectancies could have a more powerful 
association with action than the self, suggesting that emotions might play a greater role in 
prosocial and antisocial action than value structures. Thus, the nature of the relationships 
among moral emotions, the moral self, and moral and immoral behavior was explored 
through this research. 
Hypotheses 
The specific hypotheses and goals of the present research are as follows: 
i) Both positive (pride, satisfaction) and negative (guilt, embarrassment) self-
evaluative emotion expectancies are associated with levels of antisocial 
behavior, 
ii) Similarly, both positive (pride, satisfaction) and negative (guilt, 
embarrassment) self-evaluative emotion expectancies are associated with 
levels of prosocial behavior, 
iii) Moral emotion expectancies are increasingly predictive of behavior (prosocial 
and antisocial) with age. 
iv) Finally, this research compared the associations of moral action in two 
domains (prosocial and antisocial) with moral emotion expectancies and the 
moral self. 
Method 
A total of 235 participants from grades 1 (n = 48; 10 males), 9 (n = 53; 19 males), 
11 (n = 54; 18 males), and first-year university (n = 80; 14 males) participated in this 
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study. The procedures used with the university sample differed slightly from that used 
with the younger samples, and a requisite of this difference was a disproportionately high 
number of university participants compared to the other age groups examined. As such, 
50 university students were randomly selected to be included in the cross-sectional 
comparisons in order to approximate the number of participants from each of the other 
age groups. The only restriction on this selection was that all male university participants 
were included in the 50 selected for the cross-sectional analyses as this led to a male-
female ratio similar to that present in the younger samples. Thus, the composition of 
participants and procedures used are discussed separately for the cross-sectional analyses 
and for the analyses specific to the university sample. 
Cross-sectional Sample 
Participants 
The cross-sectional analyses included 205 adolescents from grades 7 (n = 48; 10 
males), 9 (n = 53; 19 males), and 11 (n = 54; 18 males), in addition to a sample of first-
year university students (n = 50; 14 males). The participants ranged in age from 11.33 to 
19.08 years (M= 14.83, SD = 2.21). Elementary and high school participants were 
obtained from consenting schools in the Waterloo, Ontario region and were paid for their 
involvement in the study. The university students were recruited through first-year 
psychology courses at Wilfrid Laurier University and these participants received class 
credit as well as monetary compensation for their participation. After providing informed 
consent, participants were required to complete a written questionnaire as well as an 
interview component. 
Measures 
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Interview 
The interview component of the study consisted of 18 vignettes describing 
everyday situations in which a moral obligation is either regarded or disregarded. The 
situations describe moral conflicts that people are typically faced with in their everyday 
life (e.g. deciding whether or not to help someone who is hurt, wanting to steal a 
desirable item that you can't afford). The vignettes involve the three moral norms of 
respecting the property of others, honesty, and refraining from physically harming others. 
The three moral norms are presented in three different contexts. In an antisocial context 
the person observes others transgressing a moral norm, in a prosocial context the person 
is presented with an opportunity to help others, and in a temptation context the person is 
tempted to break a moral rule in order to gain personal profit. The scenarios are based on 
those used by Arsenio et al. (2004), but were created for this research. The vignettes were 
created so that a particular type of moral situation (e.g. stealing, cheating) is present in 
two scenarios: one scenario in which the moral norm is disregarded and one in which that 
same moral norm is regarded. All 18 scenarios used in the interview are presented in 
Appendix A. The vignettes were printed onto index cards and interviewers shuffled the 
cards prior to each new participant. In this way, the scenarios were presented in a 
randomized fashion. 
Following each vignette, participants were asked to indicate how they would feel 
in this situation by distributing ten plastic chips on a poster board depicting eight 
emotions (happy, sad, proud, satisfied, angry, scared, embarrassed, and guilty). An 
additional category, ok/neutral, was also present on the poster board but was not included 
in analyses involving the emotion variables. Both the printed word and a drawing of the 
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emotional expression were presented on the poster. After distributing the chips, 
participants were asked to provide an explanation as to why they expected to feel each 
emotion indicated. Follow-up questions were used to ascertain why certain values or 
obligations were considered important by the participant. The qualitative data were 
obtained as part of a larger research project, of which this study was only a part. Only 
analyses of quantitative data are discussed here, as the qualitative interview data are 
presented elsewhere (e.g. Krettenauer & Johnston, submitted). The procedure used was 
similar to that of Arsenio et al. (2004). 
Additionally, overall emotion ratings were assessed by asking participants to 
predict their overall emotion in each situation using a 7-point Likert type scale. After 
reporting their specific emotion expectancies using the chips, participants were presented 
with a scale ranging from very bad to very good with neutal/ok as the mid-point. They 
were asked to think about all of the various individual emotions, positive and negative, 
they anticipated in the situation to arrive at an overall valence. Thus, these overall 
emotion ratings represent a broader picture of the individual's emotional experience in a 
situation, and combine both moral (e.g. pride) and non-moral (e.g. happy) discrete 
emotions. This measure is similar to one used by Krettenauer & Eichler (2006). 
Scores were obtained for both positive self-evaluative and negative self-
evaluative emotion expectancies for each participant based on his or her chip 
distributions. Positive emotion expectancies were calculated as the sum of the proportion 
of chips placed on proud (M= 2.60, SD= 1.43; range = 0 to 7.05) or satisfied (M = 2.21, 
SD=\ .36; range = 0 to 5.60) for all vignettes in which a moral norm is regarded (i.e. the 
proportion scores for the nine regarded scenarios were summed). Negative emotion 
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expectancies were calculated as the sum of the proportion of chips placed on 
embarrassed (M= 0.56, SD = 0.72; range = 0 to 3.40) or guilty (M= 5.02, SD = 1.58; 
range = 0.60 to 8.91) for all nine vignettes in which a moral norm is disregarded. 
Descriptive statistics for each age group on all measures used in the study are presented 
in Table 1. 
Each positive emotion expectancy (i.e. pride and satisfaction) and each negative 
emotion expectancy (i.e. embarrassment and guilt) was examined as an independent 
predictor; thus, four variables representing self-evaluative moral emotion expectancies 
were obtained. The reliability across norm-disregarded vignettes of guilt ratings was 
Cronbach's alpha = .61, and the reliability of embarrassment ratings across these 
vignettes was .61. Across norm-regarded vignettes, pride ratings had a reliability of 
Cronbach's alpha = .59 whereas satisfied ratings had a reliability of .56. Therefore, the 
reliability of the emotion ratings appears to be low, but this may result from the fact that 
the emotions are assessed using different types of situations. For example, although 
donating money to a charity and refraining from cheating on a test both involve 
adherence to moral norms, these two situations may not elicit quite the same emotion 
expectancies from an individual. 
In addition to the individual emotion ratings, an overall score representing the 
participant's overall emotion expectancy was obtained for scenarios in which a moral 
norm is regarded and for scenarios in which a moral norm is disregarded. This score was 
calculated by summing the overall scale ratings (ranging from 1 to 7) across all nine 
norm-regarded vignettes and then all nine norm-disregarded vignettes, respectively. 
These scores provide a measure of the individual's general expected emotional response 
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to moral situations when taking into account all the emotions he or she would experience 
in the situation. Overall ratings for disregarded scenarios ranged from 10 to 46 (M= 
21.73, SD = 6.04) and overall ratings for regarded scenarios ranged from 31 to 62 (M= 
49.05, SD = 5.95). The same 7-point scale (very bad to very good) was used for norm-
regarded and norm-disregarded scenarios. Thus, a score of 36 represents a mean rating of 
neutral/ok on those nine scenarios. The mean of the disregarded scenarios (21.73) 
demonstrates that participants generally reported emotional expectations closer to the 
negative end of the scale in these situations, while expectations closer to the positive end 
of the scale (49.05) were reported for regarded scenarios. Cronbach's alpha for the 
overall ratings given in response to norm-disregarded scenarios was .76, while the 
reliability for norm-regarded scenarios was .74. 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used in the study was a compilation of various measures. 
Self-reportedprosocial and antisocial behavior. Self-reported antisocial and 
prosocial behavior levels were assessed by listing 50 different activities and asking 
participants to indicate how often they engaged in each of these behaviors in the last year. 
Items assessing antisocial behavior were compiled from a variety of antisocial behavior 
scales: the Short-Nye Self-Report Delinquency Items (Short & Nye, 1958), the Seattle 
Self-Report Instrument (Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 1981), the Self-Reported 
Delinquency Form for Youths (Blakely, Kushler, Parisian, & Davidson, 1980), the Self-
Report Delinquency Scale (Gibson, 1967), in addition to items used by Raaij makers, 
Engels, and Van Hoof (2005) and Overbeek, Vollebergh, Meeus, Engels, and Luijpers 
(2001). Items were chosen for the present study based on their frequency in the 
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previously mentioned scales and also their applicability to the age group of present 
participants. The items range from minor delinquent acts, such as fare-dodging, to more 
violent offenses, such as assault. The 20 antisocial items were found to have a 
Cronbach's alpha of .78. 
The Youth Inventory of Involvement scale (Pancer, Pratt, Hunsberger, & Alisat, 
2007) was used to assess prosocial behavior in various areas (e.g. community, school, 
and politics) and includes various types of behavior (e.g. being member of a group, or 
organizing an event). The validity of this scale has been demonstrated and the scale has 
excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha from .88 to .90; Pancer et al., 2007). In 
the present sample, these 30 items were shown to have a Cronbach's alpha of .87. 
Although all 30 items were presented to participants, the final score representing 
prosocial behavior derived for the analyses included only a subset of the total items. In 
order to obtain a measure of prosocial behavior similar to the type of prosocial action 
present in the interview vignettes, only items which related to the actions of helping 
others, donating money or time, and volunteering were included. Items relating to 
political and religious action were excluded, as these items may represent a different type 
of prosocial behavior. Nine items were selected to create the overall prosocial behavior 
score, and these items had a Cronbach's alpha of .74. The lower reliability of this subset, 
as compared to the full scale, is expected due to the fewer number of items included, and 
the subset correlated highly with the full scale r (204) = .88,/? < .001. 
The compilation of antisocial items and the Youth Inventory of Involvement scale 
were presented to participants as one scale (prosocial and antisocial items intermixed) 
and included statements such as "Intentionally damaged or destroyed people's private 
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property" (antisocial) and "Visited or helped out people who were sick" (prosocial). 
Participants were asked to indicate whether, in the past year, they: never did this, did this 
once or twice, did this a few times, or did this several times. In this sample, scores on the 
nine prosocial items ranged from 0 to 26 (M= 14.36, SD = 5.18). Scores on the 20 
antisocial items ranged from 0 to 38 (M= 5.76, SD = 5.87). 
Self-centrality of moral attributes. The questionnaire also included the Good-Self 
Assessment (Barriga et al., 2001) developed by Arnold (1993). This scale measures the 
centrality of moral personality traits to an individual's self-understanding. The measure 
consists of 16 questions which ask the participant "How important is it to you that you 
are....?" Eight questions end with a moral characteristic while the other eight end with a 
non-moral characteristic that is still socially desirable (e.g. outgoing/sociable). The eight 
moral traits included were: considerate/courteous, honest/truthful, kind/helpful, 
understanding/sympathetic, generous/giving, sincere/genuine, fair/just, and 
responsible/dependable. Each item gave two synonyms of the trait to help disambiguate 
the meaning of the personality characteristic in question. The eight non-moral traits 
included were: creative/imaginative, careful/cautious, outgoing/sociable, athletic/agile, 
funny/humorous, logical/rational, independent/self-reliant, and active/energetic. 
For each item, participants were required to select among extremely important to 
me, very important to me, important to me, sort of important to me, and not important to 
me to state how central the characteristic in question was to their sense of self. These 
responses were scored from 1 {not important to me) to 5 {extremely important to me). 
Summed scores of the eight moral items ranged from 17 to 40 (M= 31.43, SD - 4.58). 
Cronbach's alpha for the eight moral items was .80. Summed scores of the eight non-
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moral items ranged from 17 to 38 (M= 27.73, SD = 4.35) with a Cronbach's alpha of .56. 
An overall score representing the centrality of moral traits to the self was derived by 
using the standardized residuals from a regression predicting the centrality of moral 
characteristics from the centrality of non-moral characteristics. Thus, more positive 
scores represent a greater centrality of moral traits after taking into account the centrality 
of other socially desirable traits to that individual. 
Social desirability response bias. Additionally, the questionnaire included a well-
validated measure of socially desirable response biases (Blake, Valdiserri, Neuendorf, & 
Nemeth, 2006). This measure was created for use with youth samples and is comprised of 
17 items, such as "I occasionally speak badly of others behind their backs" and 
"Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return." Participants were asked to 
read these statements and check true ox false depending on whether the item described 
them or not. After reverse coding all negative items, a sum score was calculated with 
higher scores representing a greater socially desirable response bias. The Cronbach's 
alpha of these 17 items was .65. Scores on this measure ranged from 1 to 17 (M= 8.28, 
SD = 3.17). 
Procedure 
Data from the elementary school and high school participants were obtained as 
part of a larger research project already underway. After receiving approval from both the 
Wilfrid Laurier University ethics review board and the Waterloo Region District School 
Board, public schools in the Kitchener-Waterloo region were contacted. Students in 
grades 7, 9, and 11 at interested schools were invited to participate in the study for 
Moral Emotions 36 
monetary compensation. Interviews and questionnaires were administered to students at 
their schools but not during class time. 
Interviews were conducted by six individuals who received training on the 
interview protocol. Before the interview began, participants were familiarized with the 
emotion poster and chip distribution procedure by reporting their current emotional state 
using the chips. All interviews were tape recorded for later transcribing and coding, but 
during the interview interviewers manually recorded the number of chips placed on each 
emotion and the overall emotion rating. 
Questioning followed a similar pattern after each vignette was read. Participants 
were asked to think about how they would feel in this particular situation and to report 
these emotion expectancies by placing up to 10 chips on the poster depicting emotional 
expressions. Participants were instructed to use as many or as few of the 10 chips as they 
felt was necessary and to place chips on any number of emotional expressions at one 
time. Once the chips were placed, participants were asked to explain why they expected 
to feel each of the selected emotions. Follow-up questions were used to probe the reasons 
why moral values and actions were considered important by the individual. For example, 
one common follow-up probe was "Why would it be important to you to do the right 
thing in this situation?" The qualitative interview data were used in a separate research 
project (Krettenauer & Johnston, submitted). After all emotion expectancies were probed, 
participants were presented with a 7-point scale and asked to rate their overall emotion 
expectancy from very bad to very good. Once participants completed the interview and 
questionnaire they were paid $15 and provided with a debriefing sheet. 
University Sample 
Moral Emotions 37 
Participants 
The university sample included 80 participants (66 females) recruited through 
first-year psychology courses at Wilfrid Laurier University. Participants ranged in age 
from 16.25 to 21.33 years (M= 17.66, SD = .69). This group of participants received 
class credit as well as monetary compensation for their participation. 
Measures 
Participants in the university sample were given the same interview and 
questionnaire already described as part of the cross-sectional study. Two additional 
assessments, which measured observable behavior, were used with the sample of 
university students. A measure of honesty, based on the procedure used by Bersoff 
(1999), was used whereby half of the university participants were overpaid for their 
involvement in the study and whether they reported this mistake or not was taken as a 
measurement of honesty. The other half of university participants were given the 
opportunity to donate a portion of their monetary compensation to a campus charity 
campaign (United Way) and the amount of money donated was used as a measure of 
prosocial behavior. The procedure used to measure prosocial behavior was modeled after 
that used by Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, and Bartels (2007). 
The honesty condition (n = 40) included 8 male participants. In this condition, 24 
participants (6 males) were honest with the interviewer and attempted to return the extra 
money, while the other 16 participants did not. The charitable behavior condition (n = 40) 
included 6 male participants. In this condition, the amount of money donated ranged from 
$1 to $15 (M= 2.11, SD = 3.53). Of the 19 participants who donated money, only two 
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participants donated all $15; thus, a dichotomous variable was created (donated money 
vs. did not donate money) to minimize the influence of these outliers on the results. 
Procedure 
Undergraduate students were given the opportunity to participate in the study to 
obtain course credit in addition to monetary compensation. Participants were recruited 
through an introductory psychology class at Wilfrid Laurier University. They signed up 
for time slots and came into the lab on an individual basis. Both the interview and 
questionnaire were completed by the university students following the same procedure 
used with elementary and high school participants. Interviews for this sample were 
conducted by three trained female researchers. One researcher conducted 68% of the 
interviews while the other two each conducted approximately 16% of the interviews. All 
three of these researchers also conducted interviews with participants in the younger age 
groups as part of the cross-sectional data collection. 
Once the interview and questionnaire components of the study were completed, 
participants completed one of two conditions (prosocial or honesty) for the third part of 
the study. The prosocial condition was run first, with the first 40 university participants 
completing this behavioral assessment. The final 40 participants comprised the honesty 
condition. Individuals assigned to the 'honesty' condition were overpaid for their 
participation, seemingly as the result of a mistake by the interviewer. Prior to their 
participation, all participants were told that they will receive $10 as compensation. In the 
honesty condition, once participants completed the interview and questionnaire they were 
again told that they would receive $10 compensation but were handed $15 (i.e. a $10 bill 
and a $5 bill instead of two $5 bills). The interviewer appeared oblivious to the mistake 
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and busied herself with some paperwork. The measure taken was whether the participant 
informed the interviewer of the mistake. Participants who attempted to return the money 
were told that the interviewer made a mistake by originally stating $10 as the payment 
and got to keep all $15. This procedure is based on one used by Bersoff (1999). 
Participants in the 'prosocial' condition were recruited for the study in a similar 
way to participants in the 'honesty' condition; that is, they were told that they would 
receive $10 compensation (in addition to course credit). Once they arrived at the study, 
however, participants were told that they would now be receiving $15 compensation. 
Upon completion of the interview and questionnaire, all participants in this condition 
were given $15. The payment was given as two $5 bills, two $2 coins, and one $1 coin. 
After paying the participant, the interviewer informed him or her that the research lab 
was collecting money for the United Way, an on-campus charity campaign. The 
interviewer then pointed out a donation box that was on the participant's way out of the 
lab. After a quick description of the charity, the interviewer stated that donations are 
appreciated but not necessary and then turned away and busied herself with some 
paperwork. The measure taken was the amount of money donated to the charity by the 
participant. All donations were given to the United Way. This procedure is based on one 
used by Twenge et al. (2007). 
In this sample, participants were debriefed following the interview and 
questionnaire in the same way as the high school sample. Thus, they believed that the 
study was over. Following this, the behavioral assessment took place (honesty or 
charitable behavior assessment). Participants were then debriefed a second time regarding 
this third measure. As participants were not able to give informed consent for this final 
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behavioral measure, they were given the option of withdrawing from the third part of the 
study at that point in time, in which case their data would have been destroyed. No 
participants chose to withdraw from this or any other part of the study. 
Results 
The data were used to explore four main hypotheses: moral emotion expectancies 
are associated with prosocial behavior, moral emotion expectancies are associated with 
antisocial behavior, moral emotion expectancies become more predictive of behavior 
with age, and the data were also used to explore the associations among moral emotion 
expectancies, moral behavior, and the moral self. Results will be discussed first for the 
cross-sectional sample, which includes the grade seven (n = 48), nine (n = 53), and 
eleven (n = 54) participants as well as the 50 randomly selected university participants. 
Preliminary analyses in this sample investigated possible age and gender differences in 
the three categories of variables included in the study: moral emotions, moral behavior, 
and the moral self. Additionally, the contributions of each moral emotion expectancy 
variable to the overall scale ratings were examined. Next, correlational analyses among 
the three categories of variables (moral emotions, moral behavior, and the moral self) 
were conducted, followed by regression analyses examining the relative contributions of 
moral emotions and the moral self to moral behavior and possible interactions with age. 
After presenting the cross-sectional results, the analyses involving the behavioral 
measures administered to the full university sample will be discussed. These analyses 
consisted primarily of correlations among the variables of interest. 
Cross-sectional Sample 
Preliminary Analyses: Gender and Age Differences 
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Moral emotion expectancies. Univariate ANOVAs were used at the outset to 
determine any gender and age differences in the tendency to report each of the four moral 
emotion expectancies (pride, guilt, embarrassment, satisfaction). The four emotion 
variables were calculated as the proportion of chips placed on that emotion during the 
interview vignettes. The proportions were summed across nine of the 18 scenarios (the 
nine scenarios in which a moral norm was disregarded for guilt and embarrassment 
ratings, and the nine scenarios in which a moral norm was regarded for pride and 
satisfaction ratings). Results of the ANOVAs showed a significant age group effect for 
embarrassment ratings, F (3,197) = 2.91,/? = .036. Least Significant Difference (LSD) 
post-hoc tests (a = .05) revealed that the university participants {M= .80, SD = .82) 
differed significantly from the grade 7 (M= .49, SD = .66) and grade 9 (M= .39, SD = 
.57) participants but not from the grade 11 participants (M= .56, SD = .76). Thus, these 
findings show significant increase in embarrassment ratings in situations where a moral 
norm is disregarded with increasing age. 
For pride ratings in response to regarded scenarios, a significant age group by 
gender interaction was found, F (3,197) = 5.70, p = .037. In this case, grade seven males 
reported the least amount of pride (M= 1.81, SD = 1.30) while grade seven females 
reported the highest levels of pride (M= 3.16, SD = 1.54), all other means ranged from 
2.25 to 2.81 (SDs of .95 to 1.70). When looking at satisfaction ratings for regarded 
scenarios, a significant age group effect was found, F (3,197) = 7.00,/? < .001, whereby 
the university participants (M= 3.01, SD = 1.40) reported significantly higher levels of 
satisfaction than the grade seven students (M- 1.79, SD = 1.34), grade nine students (M 
= 1.95, SD = 1.29), and grade eleven students (M= 2.08, SD = 1.14). No age or gender 
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effects were found for guilt ratings. Thus, it appears that in this sample, expectations of 
embarrassment following the transgression of a moral rule and satisfaction after obeying 
a moral rule increase with age, while expectations of pride are quite different for young 
males and females but become more similar with age. 
Univariate ANOVAs were also used to determine whether any age or gender 
differences were present in the overall emotion scale ratings (ranging from 1 to 7) 
representing the overall emotional valence and strength of that valence expected in the 
situations. No significant age or gender effects were found for overall ratings in the 
regarded or the disregarded scenarios; however, in disregarded scenarios males (M= 
22.93, SD = 5.96) reported slightly more positive ratings than females (M= 21.22, SD = 
6.02) and this approached significance, F( 1,192) = 339,p = .067. 
Self-reported moral behavior. Investigations into possible age and gender 
differences in self-reported antisocial and prosocial behavior were also conducted. A 
univariate ANOVA examining antisocial behavior as a dependent variable found both a 
significant effect of age group, F (3,196) = 3.35, p = .020, and a significant effect of 
gender, F (1,196) = 10.70,p = .001. Males (M= 7.69, SD = 7.02) reported higher levels 
of antisocial behavior than females (M= 4.94, SD = 5.12), and university students (M= 
7.92, SD = 6.18) reported significantly more antisocial behavior than grade 7 (M- 4.21, 
SD = 5.89) and 9 (M= 5.06, SD = 5.47) students, but not significantly more than grade 11 
students (M= 5.81, SD = 5.51). Thus, a significant increase in antisocial behavior with 
age was demonstrated. Similar analyses using prosocial behavior as the dependent 
variable demonstrated only a marginal effect of gender, F (1,197) = 3.79, p = .053. 
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Females (M= 14.80, SD = 5.10) reported slightly more prosocial activities than males (M 
= 13.33, SD = 5.25). 
Moral self. Finally, a univariate ANOVA was used to examine age and gender 
differences in the standardized residual score obtained when predicting scores reflecting 
the importance of moral traits from scores reflecting the importance of non-moral, 
socially desirable traits. This analysis revealed a significant effect of gender, F( 1,196) = 
7.56,p = .007, with females (M= .06, SD = .95) obtaining a more positive residual than 
males (M= -.35, SD = \.\). Thus, females were more likely to value moral characteristics 
than males after taking into consideration their self-importance of non-moral traits. No 
age differences were found in the importance of moral characteristics to the self in this 
sample, F (3,196) = .82,p = .482. Although age differences may be expected, similar 
findings have previously been reported demonstrating that the place of morality in the 
self shows little change through adolescence (e.g. Arnold, 1993). 
Preliminary Analyses: Relations between Specific Emotions and Overall Ratings 
The procedure of the current research involved two methods of assessing emotion 
expectancies: chip ratings of eight specific emotions, and a scale rating of the overall 
emotional experience. The overall ratings were meant to capture the full picture of an 
individual's anticipated emotional experience, and participants were asked to combine all 
of the specific emotions they would feel into one overall rating. To assess whether this 
was in fact the case, the next line of investigation examined how each of these specific 
emotion expectancies contributed to the overall emotional ratings expected in a situation. 
Two linear regressions were conducted, first with the overall ratings in disregarded 
scenarios as the dependent variable and then with the overall ratings in regarded 
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scenarios as the dependent variable. The summed proportions of each of the emotions 
(guilty, proud, satisfied, embarrassed, angry, scared, happy, sad) expected in the 
respected set of scenarios (disregarded, regarded) were used as the predictors. For 
disregarded ratings, the model was significant, F (8, 191) = 28.82,/? < .001, with 54.7% 
of the variance accounted for. The highest standardized beta coefficients were for guilty 
(P = -.49) and sad (P = -.44). When correlating each emotion with the overall ratings for 
disregarded scenarios, all emotions except for embarrassed and scared were correlated 
with the overall ratings (significant r (198)'s range from -.20 to .59; see Table 2) 
The linear regression with overall ratings for regarded scenarios as the dependent 
variable also found a significant model, F (8, 174) = 27.68, p < .001, with 56.0% of the 
variance accounted for. The emotions with the highest standardized beta coefficients 
were proud (P = .51) and happy (P = .44). When correlating each emotion with the 
overall ratings for regarded scenarios, all emotions were significantly correlated except 
for satisfaction (significant r (197)'s range from -.24 to -.41; see Table 3). Thus, it 
appears that when making a judgment of the overall emotional experience they anticipate 
in a situation, participants were able to consider the specific emotions they would 
experience and average across these, with some emotions making a larger contribution 
than others. 
Correlational Analyses 
Correlational analyses were used to test the hypothesis that moral emotion 
expectancies are associated with prosocial and antisocial behaviors and to also get a 
preliminary picture of the associations among moral emotion expectancies, moral 
behavior, and the moral self. 
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Moral emotions and the moral self. Each of the four moral emotion expectancies 
was correlated with the standardized residual score representing the self-importance of 
moral values (moral self) to determine whether the extent to which individuals value 
moral traits is associated with the emotions they anticipate in moral situations. Out of the 
four moral emotions examined in this research (guilt, pride, satisfaction, embarrassment) 
only guilt was significantly correlated with the self-importance of moral values, r (202) = 
.16, p = .026. When correlating the self-importance of moral values with the overall 
emotion ratings, however, a much stronger association was observed. Overall ratings in 
disregarded scenarios, r (197) = -.46, p < .001, and overall ratings in regarded scenarios, r 
(196) = .30, p < .001, were both significantly correlated with the present measure of the 
moral self (see Table 4). Therefore, it seems that the overall emotional experience 
anticipated in moral situations is more closely associated with the moral self than the 
expectation of any specific moral emotion. This finding seems to suggest that all 
emotions anticipated in a situation are required to best predict behavior in a moral 
context, of which self-evaluative moral emotions are only a part. 
Moral emotions and self-reported behavior. Correlational analyses were also used 
with all four moral emotion expectancy variables and both self-reported antisocial 
behavior and self-reported prosocial behavior to determine whether the emotions that 
participants expected in moral situations was related to their behavior in similar 
situations. Self-reported antisocial behavior was found to correlate significantly only with 
expectations of guilt, r (202) = -.22, p = .002. The only significant correlation found with 
self-reported prosocial behavior was expectations of embarrassment, r (203) = .15,/? = 
.034. When correlating the two behavioral measures with the overall emotion ratings, it 
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was found that the overall ratings for disregarded scenarios were associated with 
antisocial behavior scores, r (197) = .34,/? < .001, but not prosocial behavior scores, and 
overall ratings for regarded scenarios predicted prosocial behavior scores, r (197) = .16,/? 
= .027, but not antisocial behavior scores (see Table 4). Thus, behavior appears to be 
more closely associated with expectations of the overall emotional rating of a situation 
than any specific emotion. Additionally, these associations appear independent to the 
type of situation at hand, that is, when presented with an opportunity to transgress a 
moral rule versus when presented with an opportunity to follow a moral rule or engage in 
prosocial activities. 
Self-reported behavior and the moral self. Both types of moral behavior were 
correlated with the self-importance of moral values scores to explore whether, in the 
present sample, moral behavior was associated with an individual's moral self. The self-
importance of moral values score was found to correlate with both self-reported antisocial 
behavior, r (201) = -.22, p = .002, and self-reported prosocial behavior, r (202) = .24, p < 
.001 (see Table 4). Therefore, the results indicate that, after taking into account the 
importance of non-moral traits, individuals who rate moral traits as more important to 
their self-concept are significantly more likely to engage in prosocial activities and 
significantly less likely to engage in antisocial activities than individuals for whom moral 
traits are less important. 
Regression Analyses 
Based on the correlational analyses just presented, the overall emotional ratings 
appear to capture more fully the emotion expectancies associated with moral situations. 
These ratings were shown to be comprised of the specific emotions expected in the 
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situation and the ratings also have greater associations with the moral self and moral 
behavior. For this reason, the overall emotion ratings for regarded and disregarded 
scenarios were used in the regression analyses instead of the four moral emotion 
expectancy variables. Linear regressions were used to further explore the associations 
that emotion expectancies and moral self scores have with behavior. 
The first regression examined self-reported prosocial behavior as the dependent 
variable and included the overall emotion ratings for disregarded scenarios, overall 
emotion ratings for regarded scenarios, and the self-importance of moral traits scores as 
the predictors. This model was shown to be significant, F (3,189) = 3.96,p = .009, with 
5.90% of the variance accounted for by the model. The only predictor in the model that 
was significant, however, was the self-importance of moral values (moral self), t (186) = 
2.56,/? = .011 (see Table 5a). Thus, the moral self appears to predict self-reported 
prosocial activities whereas the moral emotion variables did not contribute significantly 
to the model (see Figure 2). To ensure that the effect of the moral self score on prosocial 
behavior could not be explained by social desirability, age or gender, the regression was 
run a second time with the self-importance of moral trait scores, age, gender, and social 
desirability as the predictors. The score representing participants' moral self remained 
significant in predicting self-reported prosocial behavior, t (193) = 2.91,/? = .004, while 
none of the control variables contributed significantly to the model (see Table 5b). 
The second regression examined self-reported antisocial behavior as the 
dependent variable and included overall emotion ratings for disregarded scenarios, 
overall emotion ratings for regarded scenarios, and the self-importance of moral traits 
scores as the predictors. This model was also shown to be significant, F (3,188) = 9.11,p 
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< .001, with 12.7% of the variance accounted for. In this model, the only significant 
predictor was the overall emotion ratings for disregarded scenarios, t (185) = 4.03, p < 
.001 (see Table 6a). Thus, unlike prosocial behavior, self-reported antisocial activities are 
significantly predicted by the overall emotions expected in similar situations where a 
moral norm is broken, but is not significantly predicted by the moral self or by emotions 
expected in situations where a moral norm is followed (see Figure 2). 
Similar to the regression involving prosocial behavior, this regression was run a 
second time with emotion ratings for disregarded scenarios, age, gender, and social 
desirability as predictors to determine whether the emotion ratings continued to be a 
significant predictor of antisocial behavior when controlling for these three other 
variables. In this case, overall emotion ratings in disregarded scenarios remained as a 
significant predictor of self-reported antisocial behavior, t (188) = 4.16,/? < .001. All 
three control variables also contributed significantly to the model: gender, t (188) = -2.02, 
p = .045; age, t (188) = 2.42,/? = .016; social desirability, t (188) = -4.96,/? < .001 (see 
Table 6b). 
Age as a Moderating Variable 
The final analyses involving the cross-sectional data tested the hypothesis that 
emotion expectancies would become more predictive of behavior with age. Specifically, 
the data were used to investigate whether the findings from the regression analyses 
differed based on the age of the participants. Based on the analyses discussed above, it 
was shown that self-importance of moral trait scores predict self-reported prosocial 
behavior and emotion ratings in hypothetical situations where moral norms are 
disregarded predict self-reported antisocial behavior. It seems quite possible, however, 
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that participant age may moderate these relationships. As individuals progress through 
adolescence and become more sophisticated and more self-aware, their emotion 
expectancies may become more consistent. In the same way, they may be increasingly 
likely to use their emotion expectancies to regulate their behavior. Regression analyses 
were again used to test the hypothesis that emotion expectancies would predict behavior 
to a greater degree in older participants. A dummy variable representing participant age 
group was used which compared younger participants (grade seven and nine; scored as 0) 
to older participants (grade eleven and university; scored as 1). 
The first regression examining age as a moderator included the dummy age 
variable and the self-importance of moral trait scores as predictors in the first step, the 
interaction of dummy age and self-importance of moral trait scores as a predictor in the 
second step, and self-reported prosocial behavior as the dependent variable. Results 
indicated that the model including age and moral self scores was significant, F (2, 201) = 
6.27, p = .002, and this model was not improved significantly by including the interaction 
of age and moral self scores, i?2 change = .004,/? = .365. Thus, the relationship between 
the moral self and prosocial behavior does not appear to be moderated by age in this 
sample (see Table 7). 
The second regression examining age as a moderator included the dummy age 
variable and the overall emotion ratings from norm-disregarded scenarios as predictors in 
the first step, the interaction of these two variables as a predictor in the second step, and 
self-reported antisocial behavior as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis 
demonstrated that the model including age and disregarded scenario ratings was 
significant, F (2,196)= 15.73,/? < .001, and that this model was improved significantly 
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by adding the interaction of age and disregarded scenario emotion ratings, R2 change = 
.03, p = .010. Therefore, the relationship between overall emotion ratings in hypothetical 
norm-disregarded scenarios and self-reported antisocial behavior is moderated by age in 
the present sample. Specifically, the predictive effect of the emotion ratings is stronger 
for older participants than for younger participants. Older participants who expect more 
positive emotions after disregarding moral norms (low levels of negative self-evaluative 
emotions) are more likely to report high levels of antisocial behavior than young 
participants who show low levels of negative self-evaluative emotions (see Table 8). The 
results remain unchanged when participants' age in years is used instead of the dummy 
age variable. 
University Sample 
The university sample completed all of the same measures as the cross-sectional 
sample plus one of two behavioral measures. The data from this sample was used to test 
the hypothesis that moral emotion expectancies are associated with both prosocial and 
antisocial behavior. This sample of university students, however, was used to compare 
the results of analyses using self-reported behavior with those using observed behavior. 
To begin with, the observed measures of dishonesty and charitable behavior were 
correlated with the moral emotion variables and the self-importance of moral values 
scores. When examining possible relationships between the four moral emotion 
expectancies variables (guilt, pride, satisfaction, embarrassment) and both of the 
behavioral measures, no correlations were significant (dishonesty, r (38)'s range = -.004 
to -.12; charitable behavior, r (38)'s range = .03 to .18). Similarly, the overall ratings for 
regarded and disregarded scenarios were not significantly correlated with the two 
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behavioral measures of dishonesty (regarded, r (38) = -.13,/? = .431; disregarded, r (38) = 
.15,/? = .351) and charitable behavior (regarded, r (38) = .10,/? = .528; disregarded, r 
(38) = -.05, p = .742). Thus, it seems that the behavioral measures were not associated 
with the moral emotion variables in the present research while self-reported behaviors 
were significantly associated with emotion expectancies. 
When correlating the measure of moral self with the two behavioral scores, no 
significant correlations were found (dishonesty, r (38) = -.24,p = .135; charitable 
behavior, r (38) = -.10,/? = .540). Consequently, similar to the results with moral 
emotions, in the present research self-reported behavior was found to be associated with a 
measure of the moral self while behavioral assessments were not. When examining the 
relation between self-reported and observed behavior in the university sample, self-
reported prosocial behavior was not correlated with the dishonesty measure, r (37) = -.07, 
p = .693, or the charitable behavior measure, r (38) = .10,/? = .554. Self-reported 
antisocial behavior was not related to observed charitable behavior, r (38) = -.12, p = 
.473, but it was correlated with dishonesty, r (37) = .33,/? = .042. Thus, although people 
who reported more antisocial activities were more likely to be dishonest, the observed 
measures in the present research do not appear to be significantly related to any of the 
other variables used in the study. 
One explanation for the lack of a significant relationship between observed 
behavior and the emotion expectancy variables is that the behavioral measures assessed 
very specific behaviors, as opposed to the self-reported behavior scores which represent a 
broad and generalized measure of behavior. To determine whether emotion expectancies 
which are more specific to the behaviors assessed would predict the dishonesty and 
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charitable behavior scores, regressions were run using the overall ratings from scenarios 
dealing with those individual behaviors as predictors. The overall ratings were used as 
predictors instead of the four individual emotion variables, as the overall ratings proved 
to be more closely associated with behavior in the previous analyses. 
A regression with dishonesty as the dependent variable was run with the overall 
emotion ratings from the vignette in which the person ends up engaging in a dishonest 
act. In this scenario, the individual steals a small object from a store. Results showed that 
this model did not significantly predict dishonesty, F( l ,38) = .19,/> = .667, with only 
.50% of the variance accounted for (standardized beta = .07). Next, the overall emotion 
ratings from the vignette in which the individual acts in an honest way (does not steal 
when given the opportunity) was used as the predictor for dishonesty scores. This model 
approached significance, F ( l , 38) = 3.28, p = .078, with 7.9% of the variance in 
dishonesty accounted for (standardized beta = -.282). Perhaps with a larger sample size 
this model would have proven to be significant, suggesting that participants who 
expected to feel more positively about themselves after resisting a temptation to be 
dishonest were less likely to act in a dishonest way. 
The same procedure was employed for charitable behavior scores, using the 
overall emotion ratings from a scenario in which the person donated money to a charity 
and a scenario in which the person does not donate when presented with the opportunity. 
Neither of these emotion variables significantly predicted charitable behavior: donation 
scenario, F(\, 38) = 2.52,p = .121; no donation scenario, F ( l , 38) = 2.30,/? = .138. 
Thus, charitable behavior was not found to relate to emotion expectancies and dishonesty 
showed an association with overall ratings in a specific scenario that only approached 
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significance. These results do not confirm the relationships observed in the cross-
sectional sample and may suggest that these behavioral measures are not an adequate 
assessment of general behavioral tendencies. 
Discussion 
In the present study, we examined the relationship between moral emotion 
expectancies and moral action, both prosocial and antisocial, across adolescence. With 
this research we aimed at extending previous research on the relationship between moral 
emotions and moral behavior in childhood to look at how this association may change 
during adolescence. Additionally, we were interested in exploring the relationships 
among moral emotion expectancies, moral behavior, and the moral self. The results of 
this research will be discussed according to the hypotheses outlined previously. 
Moral Emotion Expectancies and Antisocial Behavior 
The first hypothesis was that both positive and negative moral emotion 
expectancies would be associated with levels of antisocial behavior. When correlation 
analyses were used with each of the four emotion expectancy variables and self-reported 
antisocial behavior, however, only expectations of guilt were significantly related to this 
measure. The negative association between guilt and antisocial behavior is consistent 
with the previous literature in this field, suggesting that expectations of guilt can function 
to inhibit antisocial actions (e.g. Lake et al., 1995). In this study, participants who 
anticipated feeling more guilt after engaging in antisocial behaviors reported lower levels 
of these behaviors than participants who anticipated less guilt. Although it was 
hypothesized that all self-evaluative moral emotion expectancies under investigation 
would be related to antisocial behavior, satisfaction, pride, and embarrassment were not 
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significantly correlated with this measure. Therefore, it appears that the expectation of 
positive moral emotions following adherence to a moral norm is not associated with 
adolescents' self-reported levels of antisocial behavior, contrary to what was predicted. 
Although it was hypothesized that positive moral emotion expectancies, in 
addition to negative moral emotion expectancies, would be associated with antisocial 
behavior, it is not entirely surprising that no association was found. Positive moral 
emotion expectancies were measured as the number of chips placed on pride and 
satisfaction in norm-regarded scenarios, so it does seem consistent that behavior in a 
different type of situation (when a moral norm is disregarded) would have no association 
to emotion expectancies in these situations. The lack of association between self-reported 
antisocial behavior and expectations of embarrassment is more puzzling, although 
embarrassment is generally viewed as playing a more minor role in morality than guilt 
(Tangney et al., 2007). 
An additional explanation may be seen in the distinction Lewis and Ramsay 
(2002) make between different forms of embarrassment (negative self-evaluation vs. non-
evaluative exposure to others). In the context of the present research, embarrassment 
likely signified a less intense form of shame (negative self-evaluation), and is therefore 
less predictive of antisocial behavior than the more morally relevant emotion of guilt. 
Additionally, fewer chips were placed on embarrassment than on the other moral 
emotions, although this tendency increased with age. Perhaps adolescents are just more 
likely to report guilt in moral situations that elicit negative emotions. As they get older, 
adolescents may become better at recognizing all of the negative emotions that they 
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might experience and, more specifically, may become more skilled at distinguishing 
between guilt and embarrassment. 
When looking at the overall emotion ratings participants made when asked to 
average across all emotions they anticipated in a situation, it was found that self-reported 
antisocial behavior was positively associated with ratings for scenarios in which a moral 
norm is disregarded (i.e. an immoral behavior is enacted) but was not associated with 
ratings for situations in which moral norms are followed. Thus, participants who 
anticipated a more positive overall emotional experience following an antisocial act 
reported engaging in higher levels of antisocial behavior. Levels of self-reported 
antisocial behavior were not, however, related to the overall emotional experiences that 
participants anticipated following a prosocial or moral act. The present results, therefore, 
do not confirm the hypothesis that both positive and negative moral emotion expectancies 
would predict levels of antisocial behavior. Instead, it appears that behavior in immoral 
situations is associated with emotion expectancies in these types of situations specifically, 
and is not associated with the emotional experiences anticipated when a moral norm is 
regarded. 
The fact that overall emotion ratings were predictive of antisocial behavior 
despite only one specific emotion variable being significantly related to this measure (as 
was generally the case with the other variables in this research) makes intuitive sense. An 
individual's behavior will likely be more closely associated with the overall valence of 
the emotional experience he or she anticipates following a certain behavior (i.e. positive 
or negative) rather than any specific emotion. For example, even if a person expects to 
feel high levels of guilt following an action, if he or she anticipates that the happiness of 
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obtaining a desired outcome will outweigh the guilt then behaviors that transgress norms 
may be more likely. 
This pattern found throughout the data, that overall emotion expectancies predict 
behavior better than any specific emotion, suggests that self-evaluative moral emotion 
expectancies are not as closely related to behavior in moral contexts as originally 
hypothesized. Instead, basic emotions such as happiness and sadness seem just as 
important in predicting moral action. The overall emotion ratings do have moral qualities, 
but they include other emotions as well. Therefore, it seems that while at least some self-
evaluative moral emotions do have associations with moral behavior, they do not stand 
out against other basic emotions. It is the overall emotional tone anticipated in a moral 
situation that is important. 
Using these overall ratings, it was demonstrated that the overall emotional 
experience participants anticipated after transgressing a moral norm was associated with 
the number of times they reported engaging in norm transgressions. One interpretation of 
this finding is that the overall emotion expectancies people have when contemplating an 
antisocial action may influence their decision to engage in that behavior. For example, if 
they expect that they will overall feel positively after that action, then they will probably 
be more likely to choose to enact that behavior. The participants' emotion expectancies 
following the enactment of a moral behavior, however, were not associated with their 
self-reported levels of antisocial behavior. This suggests that whether participants expect 
to feel positively or negatively following a norm-regarding action has no relation to their 
decisions when presented with an opportunity to transgress a moral rule. 
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The interpretation of these results as demonstrating a causal influence of moral 
emotion expectancies on antisocial behavior outcomes is consistent with the existing 
research in this area, outlined previously. However, as these results were obtained using 
correlational analyses, it could also be the case that it is the act of engaging in antisocial 
actions which influences later moral emotion expectancies. Individuals who engage in 
high levels of antisocial actions may come to expect lower levels of negative self-
evaluative emotions following these behaviors because these types of actions come to be 
viewed as normal activities. In all likelihood, a bi-directional relationship exists, with 
moral emotion expectancies and antisocial behavior each having an effect on the other. 
Hence, it seems likely that, although moral emotion expectancies can not be inferred as 
causing the levels of antisocial behavior measured in the present research, these emotion 
expectancies would influence future decisions when presented with an opportunity to 
transgress moral norms. 
These results found using self-reported measures of antisocial behavior were not 
replicated with the behavioral measure taken in the sample of university participants. 
When the university participants were overpaid for their participation, the measure of 
whether or not they reported this error was not related to their moral emotion 
expectancies. One reason for this may be that the moral emotion expectancy variables in 
the present study were comprised of emotion expectancies across multiple situations and, 
thus, may simply be better predictive of generalized behavior patterns than any specific 
behavior. When looking at the two specific vignettes relevant to the behavioral antisocial 
measure, overall emotion ratings approached significance as a predictor for one of these 
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vignettes. Thus, even the behavioral assessment with the university sample provided 
some evidence that overall emotion expectancies are related to antisocial actions. 
The lack of association between the behavioral measure of antisocial behavior and 
the emotion variables could also be explained by a methodological issue. This behavioral 
assessment always occurred after participants had completed the interview and 
questionnaire sections of the study. Presenting the tasks in this order was required by the 
nature of the behavioral assessment (based around compensation for participation) but it 
may be the case that participating in an interview which forces individuals to contemplate 
moral issues and respond to a questionnaire inquiring about the self7importance of moral 
values counteracted effects that would have otherwise been observed. Contemplating 
moral issues and dilemmas may have influenced the way that many of the participants 
behaved and perhaps the results would have been different had the behavioral assessment 
taken place at a different time. 
Moral Emotion Expectancies and Prosocial Behavior 
The second hypothesis was that both positive and negative moral emotion 
expectancies would be associated with levels of prosocial behavior. The little research 
previously existing on the relationship between moral emotions expectancies and 
prosocial behavior had looked at young children, but it was hypothesized that moral 
emotion expectancies would contribute to adolescent moral behavior in a similar way to 
immoral behavior. When examining the four individual moral emotion expectancies, 
however, only expectations of embarrassment were significantly correlated with self-
reported prosocial behavior. Participants who expected to feel more embarrassment after 
transgressing a moral norm reported higher levels of prosocial behavior. Thus, we found 
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that the two negative moral emotion expectancies of guilt and embarrassment were 
associated with self-reported behavior (antisocial and prosocial, respectively) but the 
positive moral emotion expectancies of pride and satisfaction were not found to relate to 
behavior in the same way. These findings suggest that negative emotion expectancies 
have a closer relationship with instances of moral behavior than expectations of positive 
emotions. One implication of this could be that the expectation of negative affect 
provides a strong motivation to avoid engaging in a particular behavior, while the 
expectation of positive affect following a response appears to be less inspiring. 
Similar to the analyses involving antisocial behavior, the overall emotion ratings 
appeared to be better predictive of self-reported prosocial behavior than any one specific 
emotion variable. Specifically, overall emotion ratings for scenarios in which a moral rule 
is regarded were positively correlated with levels of prosocial behavior. Overall emotion 
ratings for scenarios in which a moral norm was disregarded, however, were not 
associated with prosocial behavior levels. Thus, it appears that the relationship between 
moral emotion expectancies and moral behavior is specific to the type of action in 
question. Expecting to feel negatively after transgressing a moral norm is associated with 
levels of norm transgressions but not prosocial actions; and similarly, expecting to feel 
positively after adhering to moral norms is associated with levels of prosocial behavior 
and not antisocial actions. 
Contrary to the results involving self-reported prosocial behavior, no relationship 
was observed between the moral emotion expectancy variables and whether participants 
in the university sample were willing to donate money to a charity. Unlike the analyses 
involving the behavioral assessment of antisocial behavior, there was also no significant 
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relationship between charitable behavior and either of the overall emotion expectancies 
for the two situations specifically involving donating money to a charity. One explanation 
for this may be that this behavioral measure does not represent a valid assessment of an 
individual's tendency towards prosocial action. Whether participants donated money or 
not, and the amount of money they donated, were not significantly related to the measure 
of self-reported prosocial behavior used in the study. This suggests that donation 
behavior, as measured in the current study, did not provide an accurate depiction of 
participants' generalized prosocial tendencies. Additionally, the association between self-
reported prosocial behavior and the overall emotion expectancy variables was much 
weaker than the association between self-reported antisocial behavior and the overall 
emotion expectancy variables. Emotion expectancies may just have a weaker association 
with prosocial behavior which was not able to be observed in this size of a sample. 
Relationships among Moral Emotions, Moral Behavior, and the Moral Self 
An additional goal of this research was to compare the association between moral 
emotion expectancies and moral action to the association between the moral self and 
moral action. This research suggests that the best predictor of behavior depends on the 
type of action in question (see Figure 2). The results suggest that antisocial behavior is 
predicted by overall emotion expectancies, such that individuals who expect to feel more 
negatively after transgressing a moral norm are less likely to engage in antisocial 
activities than individuals who do not expect these negative emotions. Prosocial behavior, 
on the other hand, appears to be predicted by the self-importance of moral traits, with 
individuals who consider moral characteristics integral to their sense of self reporting 
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more prosocial activities than individuals for whom moral characteristics are less self-
important. 
The different patterns found when predicting antisocial and prosocial behaviors 
are supported by the results of various research findings. To begin with, the majority of 
research demonstrating a link between the moral self and moral behavior has focused on 
prosocial activities as the outcome measure (e.g. Arnold, 1993; Colby & Damon, 1995) 
whereas most research indicating an association between moral emotions and moral 
behavior has focused on antisocial activities (e.g. Arsensio et al., 2004; Lochman & 
Dodge, 1994). Perhaps this pattern in the research is indicative of a real difference in the 
factors that influence prosocial versus antisocial behaviors. In line with this idea, Arnold 
(1993) demonstrated that the effect of moral judgment on prosocial behavior was 
moderated by moral self-relevance. When Barriga et al. (2001) attempted to replicate this 
moderated relationship with antisocial behavior as the outcome measure, no significant 
effects were found. Thus, it appears that the importance of moral values and traits to the 
self has a significant association with prosocial action but does not have a similar 
relationship with engagement in antisocial behaviors. 
One explanation for the relative lack of influence moral emotion expectancies 
were shown to have on prosocial behavior is that these actions may result more from a 
sense of social obligation, whereas antisocial behaviors may involve more of a cost-
benefit analyses of potential consequences. When presented with an opportunity to 
adhere to a moral norm, if there is no compelling reason not to act in a prosocial manner 
then people may feel obligated to do "the right thing." In terms of emotional 
consequences, there is not likely to be too many negative emotional consequences to this 
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type of behavior. When deciding whether or not to act in an antisocial way, however, 
doing the morally right thing often results in denying oneself a desired object or outcome, 
so this requires an individual to weigh the benefits of engaging in the behavior against 
abstaining from the behavior, and this is when emotion expectancies may come into play. 
Interestingly, this idea leads to one possibility of how the moral self, emotion 
expectancies, and behavior all relate. Perhaps when presented with the opportunity to act 
in a moral fashion, individuals with strong moral self-relevance feel obligated to behave 
prosocially in order to maintain consistency with their sense of self; or, as exemplified by 
the example presented above, prosocial responses may be automatic for individuals with 
strong moral identities, requiring little thought regarding how to act. If this is the case, it 
may be that moral emotion expectancies are only associated with prosocial behavior 
when individuals have less developed moral selves. Prosocial actions may be instinctual 
for those with high moral self-relevance, but for those with lower moral self-relevance, 
acting prosocially is not the only behavioral option available so emotional consequences 
are able to influence the response that is chosen. This possibility then leads to the 
question of why moral identities do not have the same association in antisocial situations, 
that is, why individuals with high moral self-relevance do not have an automatic response 
to avoid temptations to transgress but are instead influenced by their emotion 
expectancies. One explanation could be that opportunities to act prosocially elicit less 
intense emotion expectancies. Therefore, while the emotions in prosocial situations are 
not strong enough to overpower automatic reactions, the more intense emotion 
expectancies in antisocial situations might be enough to cause self-inconsistent behavior. 
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A second explanation for the lack of association between moral emotion 
expectancies and prosocial action in the present results is that prosocial behavior may be 
associated with moral emotions that were not investigated in the present research. In the 
current study we focused specifically on self-evaluative moral emotions, to the exclusion 
of other-oriented moral emotions like empathy and sympathy. Indeed, previous research 
has demonstrated a positive relationship between feelings of empathy and levels of 
prosocial behavior (for reviews, see Carlo, 2005, and Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 
2006). Leffel et al. (2008) also argue that sympathy/compassion represents a moral 
emotion that motivates altruistic behavior. Thus, it may simply be that antisocial 
behaviors are associated with self-oriented moral emotions while prosocial behaviors are 
associated with other-oriented emotions. In the case of other-oriented emotions, however, 
it is the actual experience of these emotions that motivates action rather than the 
expectation of this emotion as a consequence of the behavior. In fact, the other-oriented 
emotions of empathy and compassion could also contribute to the avoidance of antisocial 
behaviors. For example, a person who feels compassion for a person whose property he 
or she is about to vandalize may decide not to continue with this course of action. Future 
research in this area is required to determine the validity of this idea. 
Although a significant body of research has demonstrated a link between the 
tendency to experience empathy and levels of prosocial behavior, previous research 
examining the relative contributions of the moral self and empathy to prosocial behavior 
has shown moral self measures to be a superior predictor. Hardy (2006) demonstrated 
that in the prediction of prosocial behavior across various situations, the self-importance 
of moral characteristics explained a significant amount of variance above that accounted 
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for by moral reasoning and empathy. Thus, even when considering other-oriented moral 
emotions in addition to the self-evaluative moral emotions investigated in the present 
research it appears that the moral self may in fact be more closely related to prosocial 
behavior than emotions. Similarly, not all research examining associations between other-
oriented moral emotions and prosocial activities has found a significant relationship. 
Monroe (1991) found no difference in the empathy experienced by individuals high in 
altruism (rescuers and heroes) and a comparison group. Therefore, it seems that empathy 
and sympathy are insufficient in explaining voluntary moral action and the moral self 
appears to be a necessary explanatory component. 
Based on this, one interpretation is that individual's moral selves are impervious 
to the emotional consequences that are anticipated when prosocial actions are performed. 
The question then remains, however, as to why this is not the case for antisocial 
situations. Why might emotion expectancies overpower the moral self to dictate 
behavior? The answer to this question may lie in the nature of the emotions elicited by 
the two types of situations investigated in this research. In norm-disregarded scenarios, 
overall emotion expectancies could fall anywhere along a bipolar scale. Negative self-
evaluative emotions are likely to be elicited by these types of situations, but equally 
likely are positive outcome-oriented emotions (e.g. happiness) in response to obtaining a 
desired result. As such, some individuals might feel extremely negatively in these 
situations, some may feel quite positively, and others may expect to feel somewhat 
ambivalent about the situation. 
On the other hand, emotion expectancies in norm-regarded scenarios will 
essentially fall only along the positive end of the scale. Behavior that conforms to the 
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morally appropriate way to act in a situation can also be expected to elicit self-evaluative 
and outcome-oriented emotions, but in this case both types of emotion expectancies will 
be positive in nature. Moral norm-regarding actions can elicit positive self-evaluative 
emotions like pride because individuals feel positively about themselves for "doing the 
right thing." These behaviors can also elicit positive outcome-oriented emotions because 
individuals feel emotions like happiness for the people who they helped or how the 
situation turned out. Although negative outcome-oriented emotions could also be 
anticipated in these situations (e.g. feeling sad that you donated the money you had 
planned to spend on a trip) these are not as prominent as the positive outcome-oriented 
expectancies. In this way, emotion expectancies in norm-disregarded scenarios cover a 
broader range of possible emotional consequences which may explain why these 
expectancies predict antisocial behavior to a greater degree than positive emotion 
expectancies predict prosocial behavior. There is simply more room for individual 
difference in the emotional consequences anticipated in response to norm-disregarded 
situations than in response to norm-regarded situations. Additionally, in some norm-
regarded situations there is simply no action taken. The individuals simply refrain from 
transgressing a moral convention. They are not doing something bad, but they are also 
not actively engaging in a prosocial behavior. Thus, it is not unlikely that some people 
simply feel neutral, or do not expect any emotional reaction, in this type of scenario 
because no behavior is taking place. In this way, norm-regarded situations can again be 
seen as eliciting a narrower range of emotion expectancies and allowing less room for 
individual differences to be seen. As such, it makes sense that the moral self would be a 
better predictor of behavior in these situations. Indeed, in this sample, overall emotion 
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ratings for norm-disregarded scenarios did have a greater range and standard deviation 
than overall emotion ratings for regarded scenarios, although this difference was slight. 
The fact that emotion expectancies in norm-disregarded situations fall along a 
bipolar scale highlights the importance of positive outcome-oriented emotion 
expectancies in norm-disregarded scenarios. In fact, outcome-oriented emotions may play 
a larger role in determining moral behavior than self-evaluative emotions. Clearly, 
emotion regulation plays a role in situations where an individual is tempted to transgress 
a moral norm, and if adolescents are not able to suppress these positive emotion 
expectancies then they may transgress and act in an immoral way. The inability to 
suppress positive emotion expectancies can then help explain why the moral self plays 
less of a role in predicting levels of antisocial behavior. In norm-regarded situations, 
however, it is much less likely that individuals will have to suppress negative emotion 
expectancies. Most people will expect to feel somewhere between neutral and very 
positively about themselves, so the moral self can be seen as an influential factor in the 
decision to engage in this type of action. 
Developmental Changes 
A final hypothesis under investigation was the idea that moral emotion 
expectancies would become more predictive of behavior with age. Our results 
demonstrate a few developmental changes, but not to the extent that was originally 
expected. One age difference was seen in expectations of pride, which were divergent for 
young males and females but then became more similar with age. This unexpected 
finding may simply reflect the fact that pride is a complex emotion which can not be 
accurately anticipated by the young participants in the study. Kornilaki and Chlouverakis 
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(2004) report that studies using hypothetical scenarios to assess pride attributions (as was 
used in the current research) show a later understanding of pride as compared to studies 
which require children to generate situations in which they had experienced pride. It is 
not until the age of 11 that individuals are able to distinguish between the situational 
antecedents of pride and happiness (Kornilaki & Chlouverakis, 2004). As participants in 
the youngest age group in the present study were between 11 and 12 years of age, poor 
understanding of the complexities of pride may be what resulted in pride ratings for this 
age group that differed from all older age groups. Further research on the positive moral 
emotions of adolescents is required to help explain this finding. 
The primary developmental change of interest is the finding that age moderates 
the association between emotion expectancies and self-reported antisocial behavior. The 
results demonstrated an increasing influence of emotion expectancies on behavior with 
age. As individuals get older, their overall emotion expectancies for situations in which a 
moral norm is transgressed become increasingly predictive of their antisocial behavior 
levels. This finding suggests that as individuals progress through adolescence they put an 
increasing amount of weight into the emotional consequences of their behavior when 
presented with an opportunity to transgress moral norms. Perhaps emotion expectancies 
become more consistent and accurate with age and as a result adolescents increasingly 
rely on these expectancies to anticipate the consequences of their actions. Additionally, 
adolescents may become more likely to use their emotion expectancies to regulate their 
behavior as they mature. 
At the outset, a primary goal was to examine the changes in moral emotion 
expectancies that occur across adolescence. Much less change was observed than was 
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expected. This could suggest that once moral emotion expectancies are formed in early to 
middle childhood there are few further developmental changes. These expectancies may 
simply represent an individual difference which is more closely tied to other variables, 
such as the social context, temperament, or cognitive factors, than development. 
Murgatroyd and Robinson (1997) demonstrated that 30% of adults attributing emotions 
to wrongdoers fail to list any moral emotions, suggesting that for some individuals there 
may be little development in moral emotion expectancies across adolescence and 
adulthood. Nunner-Winkler's (2007) work on moral motivation demonstrated small 
increases in group means over adolescence and early adulthood, but large variations in 
individual trajectories, with some people showing increases and others decreases. A 
similar pattern may be found in the development of moral emotion expectancies, with 
multiple trajectories of development possible. 
Although moral emotion expectancies may show little development in 
adolescence, during this time individuals may become more confident in their emotion 
expectancies and become more likely to use these expectancies to guide their behavior. 
This was demonstrated by the moderating effect of age found between emotion 
expectancies and antisocial behavior in the current research. Even if the expectancies 
themselves do not show a large amount of change, adolescence may represent a time 
during which individuals become more efficient and effective in both producing and 
using these anticipations. Clearly, further research is required in this area to explore the 
ways in which moral emotion expectancies develop and change across adolescence and to 
identify possible individual trajectories of development. 
Conclusions 
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The results of this research provide some evidence that moral emotion 
expectancies and their associations with behavior are still developing and changing in 
adolescence. While the majority of research in this area has focused on early and middle 
childhood, this research demonstrates that adolescence represents an additional age group 
of interest. Across adolescence, emotion expectancies become increasingly predictive of 
at least some types of behavior. Our findings also demonstrate that overall emotion 
expectancies predict behavior better than the expectancies of any individual emotions. 
Thus, although expectations of guilt are negatively associated with antisocial activities, 
the other emotions that an individual anticipates in that situation, such as happiness or 
satisfaction, also need to be taken into account to best predict behavioral outcomes. 
Based on the previous literature base in this field, an interpretation of these results 
as demonstrating an influence of moral emotion expectancies on antisocial behavior and 
the moral self on prosocial behavior is favored. However, these associations may work in 
the opposite direction or, more likely, reciprocal relationships exist in these sets of 
variables. When adolescents frequently enact antisocial actions their moral emotion 
expectancies will likely be affected. These emotion expectancies will then influence 
future instances of moral transgressions. Similarly, engaging in high levels of prosocial 
behavior will probably influence how people view themselves and the values they view 
as important to their sense of self. This self-view will then have reciprocal influence on 
their subsequent moral behavior. Hence, although causal relationships can not be inferred 
in the present research, it seems likely that emotion expectancies could influence future 
decisions when presented with an opportunity to transgress moral norms and, similarly, 
adolescents' moral selves could influence future decisions to follow moral conventions. 
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The fact that the moral self was found to be more predictive of prosocial behavior 
than moral emotion expectancies can likely be attributed to the narrow range of 
emotional consequences that can be anticipated in these situations. Antisocial behavior, 
on the other hand, is better predicted by emotion expectancies than the moral self and this 
may be due to the broad range of emotional consequences possible in norm-disregarded 
situations. Positive outcome-oriented emotion expectancies could clearly represent a 
powerful influence over behavior in these situations if they can not be regulated by the 
individual. 
In a practical sense, these findings also suggest that efforts to reduce antisocial 
behaviors in adolescents should take a divergent course of action from those aimed at 
increasing prosocial actions. Interventions with the goal of decreasing antisocial activities 
should focus on training adolescents to make negative self-evaluations following immoral 
actions. Socialization efforts aimed at heightening awareness of the negative self-
evaluations that occur following a moral transgression appear to be one method of 
reducing antisocial behavior that could prove successful. A greater awareness of the 
negative emotional consequences resulting from antisocial actions appears to be 
important. Increasing the occurrence of prosocial actions among adolescents, however, 
will require more of a focus on value internalization. Programs which help adolescents to 
integrate moral traits and characteristics into their sense of self and increase their moral 
self-relevance should prove effective based on the findings of the present research. 
Limitations 
The findings of our research are limited in a number of ways. First and foremost, 
the majority of the results are based on self-reported assessments of behavior which may 
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not represent a reliable measure of actual levels of behavior. Especially when considering 
the nature of the behavior being reported (i.e. immoral and socially undesirable actions 
such as stealing and cheating), it seems possible that participants may not have been 
completely truthful, whether consciously or not. We attempted to address this concern by 
including a sample of participants whose actual behavior was observed. Unfortunately, 
this manipulation did not produce the expected results. It may be, however, that these 
behavioral measures were simply too narrow as a measure of the behavioral tendencies of 
an individual. Future research should assess a variety of observable behaviors to obtain 
an overall picture of levels of prosocial and antisocial behavior. 
The behavioral measures observed in the university sample were also limited by 
the fact that these assessments always occurred after participants had completed the 
interview and questionnaire sections of the study. This ordering was required by the 
nature of the behavioral assessments but it may be the case that participating in an 
interview which forces individuals to contemplate moral issues and responding to a 
questionnaire inquiring about the self-importance of moral values influenced how 
participants behaved. Moral values and concerns were likely primed for these participants 
and this could have resulted in different data than would have been obtained had these 
measures been taken on a different day. Although individuals with a strong moral identity 
could be expected to act in a moral way in most situations, perhaps participants with 
weaker moral identities, who do not always act in a moral way, were influenced by the 
interview to act in a moral way. This may explain why the data obtained with the 
behavioral measures did not produce the same results as the self-report data. Clearly, 
further research is required to discover behavioral assessments which provide an accurate 
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picture of individuals' moral behavior and to further explore how measures of actual 
behavior relate to self-reports. 
Additionally, moral emotion expectancies were operationalized as the emotions 
that participants anticipated in response to hypothetical scenarios. It may be the case that 
the emotion expectancies elicited in response to real situations differ in some ways from 
those elicited by hypothetical scenarios. Similarly, when asked to anticipate the emotions 
they would experience in a situation, social scripts may have an influence on individuals' 
reported personal reactions. Adolescents likely know that they would be expected to feel 
guilt and other negative emotions following an action like stealing and so this emotional 
script may affect the emotional consequences they anticipate in a situation. However, 
previous studies using similar methodologies have determined that scenario measures 
appear to provide valid assessments of self-evaluative emotion expectancies and 
experiences (Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Tangney, 1996), so the emotion expectancy 
scores obtained in the present study are assumed to be reasonably valid. Additionally, it 
can be assumed that these social scripts would influence participants in a uniform manner 
and would, therefore, not invalidate the present results. The individual differences in 
moral emotion expectancies observed in the data also highlight the fact that adolescents 
do differ in their emotion expectancies and are not relying on social scripts when 
reporting their anticipated emotional reactions. 
A final limitation of the study surrounds the self-evaluative moral emotion 
expectancy scores obtained through the chip ratings. These variables had low reliability 
coefficients (Cronbach's alphas range from .56 to .62) suggesting that there may be a 
problem with these ratings. One reason for the low reliability scores may be that the 
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emotion expectancies are obtained using scenarios that vary in the types of situations and 
behaviors they describe, thus eliciting different types of emotional reactions. Reliability 
coefficients for the raw chip ratings were much higher than the proportion scores that 
were used in the present data analyses (e.g. Cronbach's alpha of .77 for pride and .87 for 
guilt). However, university participants, as a group, used a much larger number of chips 
than the younger participants (M= 133 chips for university students across 18 scenarios 
versus M= 99, 88, and 94 for grade 7s, 9s, and l i s , respectively). Thus, it was necessary 
to use proportion scores which resulted in lower reliability ratings for the emotion 
expectancy variables. 
Future Directions 
Future research in this area is required to replicate the pattern found in the current 
data showing moral self scores as stronger predictors of prosocial action than emotions 
but the opposite pattern when predicting antisocial behavior. Additionally, research 
should continue on with the goal of demonstrating these relationships using assessments 
of actual behaviors as the outcome measures. The significance of these results, obtained 
with self-reports, will be lessened if they can not be demonstrated when actual behavior 
is used as the dependent variable. Future research should also continue to explore the 
nature of possible relationships among moral emotion expectancies, the moral self, and 
moral behavior by examining whether emotions might represent a mediator in the 
relationship between the moral self and moral actions. The present findings suggest that, 
at least for antisocial behaviors, a mediating relationship may be possible. Tracy and 
Robins (2004) argue that self-conscious emotions are elicited through appraisals of 
Moral Emotions 74 
identity-goal relevance, suggesting that moral emotion expectancies may be, in part, 
determined by the moral self. Further research is required to explore this possibility. 
Further studies are also heeded to help explain why the present pattern of results 
exists. Why do emotions overpower the association of the moral self in the case of 
antisocial behavior, but not prosocial action? Including measures of cognitive factors may 
help to explain these findings. It could be that antisocial actions are easier to rationalize 
or justify to oneself whereas the failure to help a person in need may be seen as more 
reflective of the self and harder to explain away. Additionally, empirical investigation of 
the idea that emotion regulation plays a role in the importance of moral emotion 
expectancies in predicting antisocial action is required. The ability to suppress positive 
outcome-oriented emotion expectancies when presented with an opportunity to transgress 
a moral rule should be further explored for its ability to account for the lesser role played 
the moral self in antisocial, as opposed to prosocial, behavior. 
Additionally, the relationships among positive emotion expectancies, the moral 
self, and prosocial behavior should be explored in younger age groups. Although we 
found the moral self to be a superior predictor of behavior, this may not be the case in a 
younger sample. Before adolescence, identities are less developed and consolidated and, 
thus, likely have less influence on behavior. Perhaps in younger children emotion 
variables have a similar influence over prosocial actions as they do over antisocial actions 
and it is only once moral identities develop that they gain control over prosocial behavior. 
Further research with younger participants is required to explore this possibility. 
Finally, it is important for behavioral interventions to take findings such as these 
into consideration to maximize effectiveness. Programs focusing on value internalization 
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may succeed in developing an adolescent's moral self and may also increase their 
prosocial activities, but if reducing antisocial behavior is the intention, this type of 
program may not prove useful. Clearly, the experience of negative emotions following 
moral transgressions is important in preventing this type of action, but the suppression of 
positive outcome-oriented expectations may also prove to be crucial in decreasing the 
presence of antisocial behavior. Research should focus on determining how to increase 
awareness of the negative emotional consequences that can result from moral norm 
transgressions in order to reduce antisocial activity among adolescents. Along the same 
lines, the ability to regulate positive emotion expectancies in relation to antisocial 
activities appears to be crucial for decreasing the prevalence of these activities. 
Summary 
With this study, previous research on moral emotion expectancies in childhood 
was extended upon to investigate moral emotion expectancies and moral behavior in 
adolescence. Self-evaluative moral emotion expectancies were shown to have 
associations with antisocial and prosocial behavior, but it was the overall emotion ratings 
that were most closely associated with behavior. Thus, moral emotions do not appear to 
stand out against other, more basic emotions when predicting moral action. These overall 
ratings are associated with self-reported levels of antisocial behavior while moral self 
scores are better predictors of self-reported prosocial behavior. This finding highlights the 
important of positive outcome-oriented emotions in antisocial contexts. An inability to 
regulate these positive emotions may be one factor leading to immoral behavior. Further 
research in this area will help determine the importance of this kind of emotion regulation 
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and should also explore in more depth the relationships among emotions, moral action, 
and the moral self. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Age Group for All Measures 
Age Group 
Grade 7 Grade 9 Grade 11 University 
Emotion Variables 
Pride 
Mean(SD) 2.88(1.58) 2.78(1.55) 2.38(1.37) 2.36(1.14) 
Range .00-7.05 .00-6.50 .00-6.00 .50-5.33 
Satisfaction 
Mean(SD) 1.79(1.34) 1.95(1.29) 2.08(1.14) 2.2(1.36) 
Range .00-5.00 .00-4.33 .00-4.93 .50-5.60 
Guilt 
Mean(SD) 4.81(1.46) 5.06(1.65) 4.82(1.61) 5.41(1.55) 
Range 1.25-7.87 1.98-8.80 .60-8.10 1.21-8.91 
Embarrassment 
Mean(SD) .49 (.66) .39 (.57) .56 (.76) .79 (.82) 
Range .00-2.50 .00-2.70 .00-2.67 .00-3.40 
Overall Disregarded 
Mean(SD) 21.55(6.81) 20.92(4.66) 23.24(6.32) 21.18(6.14) 
Range 10.00-44.00 10.00-30.00 11.00-44.00 11.00-46.00 
Overall Regarded 
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Mean(SD) 50.34(5.76) 49.33(7.15) 47.96(5.51) 48.66(5.09) 
Range 37.00-60.00 31.00-62.00 35.00-58.00 37.00-59.00 
Behavior Variables 
Prosocial Behavior 
Mean(SD) 13.79(4.95) 14.25(5.26) 14.37(4.98) 15.02(5.59) 
Range 4.00-26.00 2.00-25.00 .00-26.00 2.00-26.00 
Antisocial Behavior 
Mean(SD) 4.21(5.88) 5.06(5.47) 5.81(5.51) 7.92(6.18) 
Range .00-26.00 .00-26.00 .00-27.00 1.00-38.00 
Moral Self Variables 
Moral Trait Sum 
Mean(SD) 31.31(5.21) 31.02(4.46) 31.28(4.38) 32.14(4.30) 
Range 18.00-40.00 22.00-40.00 17.00-39.00 20.00-39.00 
Non-Moral Trait Sum 
Mean(SD) 28.54(4.51) 26.92(4.40) 27.63(3.97) 27.92(4.51) 
Range 20.00-38.00 17.00-35.00 19.00-37.00 18.00-38.00 
Standardized Residual 
Mean(SD) -.16(1.12) -.08 (.95) -.08(1.02) .09 (.94) 
Range -2.82-1.77 -1.96-1.86 -3.14-1.89 -2.43-2.16 
Social Desirability 
Mean(SD) 9.21(3.53) 8.40(3.15) 8.07(2.51) 7.50(3.33) 
Range 1.00-17.00 2.00-16.00 3.00-13.00 1.00-15.00 
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Table 2 
Correlation of Each Emotion with Overall Disregarded Ratings 
Emotion Correlation with Overall Rating 
Happy 
Satisfied 
Proud 
Sad 
Scared 
Angry 
Guilty 
Embarrassed 
.593** 
.396** 
.252** 
-.243** 
-.043 
-.196** 
-.238** 
-.121 
Note: ** means the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
N = 200 
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Table 3 
Correlation of Each Emotion with Overall Regarded Ratings 
Emotion Correlation with Overall Rating 
Happy .296** 
Satisfied .047 
Proud .402** 
Sad -.346** 
Scared -.239** 
Angry -.392** 
Guilty -.412** 
Embarrassed -.237** 
Note: ** means the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
N=199 
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Table 4 
Correlations among Moral Behavior, Moral Self, and Emotion Variables 
Behavior Overall Emotions Moral Self 
Prosocial Antisocial Regarded Disregarded Self-importance 
Behavior 
Prosocial 1 
Antisocial -.005 1 
Emotions 
Regarded .157* -.022 1 
Disregarded -.117 .335** -.261** 1 
Moral Self 
Trait Self- .235** -.215** .301** -.460** 1 
Importance 
Moral Err 
Table 5 
Regressions Predicting Self-Reported Prosocial Behavior 
Predictor Standardized Beta t Sig. 
a) emotion ratings (regarded) .075 1.009 .314 
emotion ratings (disregarded) -.002 -.020 .984 
moral self score .209 2.561 .011 
b) age 
gender 
social desirability 
moral self score 
.082 
.076 
.057 
.207 
1.172 .243 
1.076 .283 
.790 .430 
2.912 .004 
Moral En-
Table 6 
Regressions Predicting Self-Reported Antisocial Behavior 
Predictor Standardized Beta t Sig. 
a) emotion ratings (regarded) 
emotion ratings (disregarded) 
moral self score 
b) age 
gender 
social desirability 
emotion ratings (disregarded) 
.105 1.451 .148 
.314 4.029 .000 
-.101 -1.285 .200 
.151 2.419 .016 
-.126 -2.018 .045 
-.316 -4.956 .000 
.260 4.159 .000 
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Table 7 
Age as a Moderator in Regression Predicting Self-Reported Prosocial Behavior 
Model Predictor Standardized Beta t Sig. 
I moral self 232 3.378 !001 
age .059 .856 .393 
2. moral self .172 1.805 .073 
age .062 .906 .366 
moral self* age .086 .908 .365 
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Table 8 
Age as a Moderator in Regression Predicting Self-Reported Antisocial Behavior 
Model Predictor Standardized Beta t Sig. 
T overall ratings (disregarded) 321 4.816 !000 
age .163 2.443 .015 
2. overall ratings (disregarded) .130 1.330 .185 
age -.457 -1.860 .064 
overall ratings (disregarded) * age .686 2.617 .010 
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Figure 1 
Relationships among Moral Emotion Expectancies, the Moral Self, and Moral Behavior 
Moral Emotion 
Expectancies 
Moral Self 
(moral self-relevance) 
Moral Behavior 
(prosocial and antisocial) 
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Figure 2 
Associations of Moral Emotions and the Moral Self with Moral Behavior 
Moral Self 
Moral 
Emotions 
p = .011 
Prosocial Behavior 
Moral Self 
Moral Emotions 
(disregarded scenarios) 
Antisocial Behavior 
p<.001 
Moral Emotions 88 
Appendix A 
Interview Scenarios 
1. While you are lining up at the bus stop you notice a pickpocket quickly drawing a 
wallet out of another person's bag. The pickpocket is about to jump on the arriving 
bus. You wonder whether you should stop him. As it turns out, you don't do anything. 
So, the pickpocket gets on the bus and drives away leaving the victim behind. 
2. While you are strolling through a flea market you notice somebody stealing a 
valuable object from one of the sales booths. You wonder whether you should 
disclose this to the vendor. So you do, and the vendor immediately goes to pursue the 
thief. 
3. Some students from your school ask you to donate money for charity. You think that 
they really pursue a good cause. Still you decide not to give them anything because 
you need all your money for a trip you want to do with your friends over the next 
weekend. 
4. Somebody in your neighborhood collects money for the needy. One day she knocks at 
your door. You think that this charity campaign really makes a difference. Therefore, 
you give her some money even though you already had made plans how to spend it. 
5. While you are strolling through a thrift store, you see a tiny thing you really would 
like to have. However, you cannot afford it. In a moment, when nobody is observing 
you, you take the object, put it in your bag and leave the store without paying. 
6. Imagine you go for a swim in the public swimming pool. In the dressing area you 
pass by an open locker with a very nice jacket hanging inside. It's a kind of jacket you 
always wanted to have but you could never afford. Apparently, somebody forgot this 
jacket as nobody is around. For a moment you think about taking the jacket and 
putting it into your locker. But then you decide otherwise. So, you go and leave the 
jacket where it is. 
7. While you are riding the bus you notice a group of youngsters in the back bullying 
another kid. They call him names and push and pull him around. The bus driver is 
obviously too busy to realize what is happening. Other passengers seem to ignore it. 
You are wondering whether you should go to the bus driver and tell him what's going 
on. In this moment, the bus arrives at your destination. So, you step out and go on 
your way. 
8. Imagine there is a group of youngsters who want to beat up another student. They 
want to take revenge on her because she blew the whistle on them for some graffiti 
they sprayed in the school building. Accidentally, you get notice of their plan. You 
wonder whether you should warn the other student so that she can take measures to 
protect herself. So, you do. As a consequence, nothing happens to the other student. 
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9. Imagine you are on the way to your friend's home. While you are riding your bike, 
you notice another biker on the other side of the road crashing into a barrier and 
falling off the bike. It looks like she really hurt herself. You are late and you don't 
want to lose time. So you pass by without stopping. 
10. Imagine as you come to a bus stop you find an elderly person sitting on the bench and 
gasping for breath. Obviously, the person is not doing well and needs medical help. 
With your cell phone you call an ambulance. You want to make sure that the elderly 
person is safe until the ambulance arrives. At the same time, you know if you don't 
catch the next bus you will miss your train. When the next bus comes to the stop you 
let it drive past. 
11. Imagine you are in a big crowd of teenagers waiting at the entrance of a music store. 
There is a lottery draw for 10 brand-new I-pods starting soon inside. Obviously, not 
all people standing outside will fit into the store. While you are approaching the 
entrance, the manager of the store gets ready to close the door. It looks like a little 
boy just in front of you will be the last person who will be allowed to enter the store. 
The manager still is busy with the door. So you push the boy away and jump the 
queue without being noticed by others. As a consequence, you are allowed to take 
part in the lottery. 
12. Imagine, one day you were waiting in a line to see your favorite musical group. There 
was just one youngster ahead of you when you heard the ticket seller say there is only 
one ticket left. The ticket seller was in a small booth and couldn't see out very well. 
When the ticket seller turned around to answer the phone, you easily could have 
knocked down the one person ahead of you to get the last ticket. For a moment you 
consider this but then you decide not to do it. So, the person in front of you gets the 
last ticket whereas you have to stay out. 
13. Imagine you notice how one student cheated in an exam by copying from another 
student. The teacher realized that the two exams look very similar. However, he 
cannot tell who copied from whom. So, he says he will assign both students an F 
unless one of the two confesses that she had cheated. Both students swear that they 
did not cheat. You wonder whether you should tell the teacher the truth. It turns out 
that you don't do anything. At the next class meeting the teacher tells both students 
that they failed the exam. 
14. Imagine, in school there were a bunch of graffiti on the bathroom wall. The principal 
is convinced that one student who did similar things in the past is responsible for the 
graffiti. He wants to punish him. However, you know better. You go to the principal 
and tell him that you actually saw another student who did it. The principal promises 
not to say who gave him this information, so you tell him the student's name. As a 
consequence, the other student who actually sprayed the graffiti got detention and had 
to wash the bathroom walls. 
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15. One day, your teacher comes into class and tells the students that she lost her 
notebook including many addresses, phone-numbers and other important data. She 
asks everybody to look around and to tell her when the notebook shows up 
somewhere. As it happened, the day before you saw the teacher's notebook lying at a 
hidden place. You wonder whether you should disclose this information to your 
teacher. Eventually, you decide not to do it. So, you sit in class and keep your 
knowledge for yourself. 
16. At the end of a school day, one of your classmates with whom you don't get along at 
all, realizes that she has lost her keys. Since her parents are away for the full day she 
won't be able to go home before school closes in the evening. She asks everybody in 
class whether they saw her keys. As it happened, around lunchtime you saw a bunch 
of key lying in a corner of the hallway. You tell this the student. She runs away to 
pick up her keys. 
17. Imagine that you have an upcoming exam in your math class that you are unprepared 
for. A classmate tells you that he has found a folder with all the questions that will be 
on the exam and the correct answers lying near the school entrance. Apparently, the 
teacher had it lost it there. He offers to let you make a copy of the answers for 
yourself. You know that you don't have enough time to study all the information 
before the exam so you decide to copy the answers and memorize them before the 
test. 
18. It is the end of the school year and you have a big project that you have to hand in 
tomorrow but you are having trouble getting started. Your older brother had to do the 
same assignment the year before and he got a really good grade on the project he 
handed in. Your brother still has his assignment and he offers to let you take it, put 
your name on it, and hand it in. You wonder if you should do it. In the end, you 
decide to do your own work and you stay up all night finishing your project. 
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Appendix B 
Self-Reported Antisocial Behavior Items 
Skipped a full day of school without a real excuse. 
Used public transportation (bus, train) without paying the fare. 
Taken something worth more than $5 from a store without paying. 
Tried to get access to an event (e.g. movie, concert) without paying. 
Taken a vehicle without the owner's permission. 
Deliberately littered the street or pavement by smashing bottles, tipping over garbage 
bins or something similar. 
Intentionally damaged or destroyed people's private property. 
Gotten into a physical fight at school. 
Smashed, slashed, or damaged things in public spaces (e.g. streets, trains, buses). 
Attacked someone with the idea of seriously hurting them. 
Used force to get money or things from someone else. 
Written on walls in public spaces with spray paint or markers. 
Drunk alcohol whilst not at home and not in a pub, e.g. in a park. 
Driven a vehicle without having a proper license. 
Stolen money from slot machines, juke boxes, or public telephones. 
Failed to return other people's belongings. 
Bought or sold things that were stolen. 
Stayed away from home at least for one night without telling my parents. 
Tried to get money by lying to someone (e.g. to a cashier). 
Used a back card without permission. 
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Appendix C 
Self-Reported Prosocial Behavior Items 
Visited or helped out people who were sick. 
Took care of other families' children (on an unpaid basis). 
Participated in or helped a charity organization. 
Led or helped out with a children's group or club. 
Helped with a fundraising project. 
Gave help (ex. Money, food, clothing, rides) to friends or classmates who need it. 
Helped people who were new to your community. 
Gave money to a cause. 
Volunteered with a community service organization. 
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